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The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper
Class: Is Notice, and its Consequent Cost,
Really Necessary?
WILLIAM WEINER*
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the English Chancery employed the bill of peace' as a
class action device in 1676,2 courts and commentators have offered
a variety of reasons for its creation and use.3 Like archenemies
united to achieve a common goal, justifications wholly inconsistent
in both theory and practice have joined to sustain the continued use
of the class mechanism. One justification holds that the class device
achieves economy of time, effort, and expense by eliminating multi-
plicity of suits (and promoting uniformity of decisions) which in-
volve common issues of law and/or fact.4 In this view, the class suit
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.S., 1965, Michigan
State University; J.D., 1970, University of Michigan.
1. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609,
611 (1971); Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as Z. CHAFEE]; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1751 (1972); 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1004, 1212 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as H. NEWBERG]; Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HAv. L. REv. 874, 928 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
2. In 1676, Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676), was decided and is
generally recognized as the first reported example of a class action. See Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 1, at 164; 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 246 (5th ed. 1941); J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §§ 94-121 (1879); Hazard, Indispen-
sable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1254,
1260 (1961); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments,
87 HARV. L. REv. 589, 590 (1974). But see Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the
Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 515, 521-24 (1974) (where the author claims that two
cases, decided in 1309 and 1565, both originating in the Channel Islands, were the "first
judicial creation of the class action").
3. See Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1805); West v. Randall,
29 F. Cas 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (no. 17,424); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE %
23.02[1] (2d ed. 1948); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at §§ 1004, 1212; F. CALVERT, A
TREATISE UPON THE LAW REPEATING PARTIES TO Sunrs IN EQUITY (2d ed. 1847); 7
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1751; Yeazell, From Group Litigation to
Class Action Part II. Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1087
(1980).
4. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 1004; Developments, supra note 1, at 928; 7
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1751; Z. CHAFEE, supra note 1, at 200-13;
Marcin, supra note 2, at 519. As Professor Moore explains: "The convenient proce-
dural device of a class action enjoys a continuing utilization because of a growing
number of instances where parties to the litigation are multitudinous; and because of the
need to eliminate or reduce multiplicity of suits." 3B J. MOORE, supra note 3, at
1
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is useful because it encourages only one lawsuit to grow where
many grew before.5 A diametrically opposed justification promotes
the class device as the only means of providing redress to large
numbers of people who have suffered similar injuries due to the acts
or conduct of powerful defendants, but who, because each individ-
ual's injury is small and the cost of litigation is high, are precluded
from obtaining individual remedies.6 This justification encourages
one lawsuit to grow where none grew before.
It is the continued vitality of this latter use of the class action suit
to which this Article is addressed. It is no exaggeration to suggest
that without the class action mechanism people who are deprived of
constitutional and civil rights, and consumers who are the victims
of fraud or antitrust violations, may be effectively deprived of any
remedy.7 Equally important, government policies aimed at cor-
recting and curbing such abuse would be undermined.8
23.02(1); see also Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Realio,
and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARv. L. REv. 664 (1979).
5. Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. Rnv. 1297 (1932). It
appears that even in its fetal stage, the courts recognized that some actions should not
merely be encouraged but should be compelled to proceed as class actions or not at all.
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
6. Framing the issue quite succinctly, Chief Justice Burger in Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980), said:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regula-
tory action of government. Where it is not economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress un-
less they may employ the class-action device.
Professors Wright and Miller agree, "The class action was an invention of equity...
mothered by the practical necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere num-
bers would not disable large groups of individuals united in interest from enforcing their
equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs." 7 C. WRiGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1751 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168
F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).
7. Judge Weinstein has poignantly stated the issue:
The matter touches on the issue of the credibility of our judicial system.
Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide a forum for
adjudication of disputes involving all our citizens-including those deprived of
human rights, consumers who overpay for products because of antitrust viola-
tions and investors who are victimized by insider trading or misleading infor-
mation-or we are not. There are those who will not ignore the irony of
courts ready to imprison a man who steals some goods in interstate commerce
while unwilling to grant a civil remedy against the corporation which has ben-
efited, to the extent of many millions of dollars, from collusive, illegal pricing
of its goods to the public. When the organization of a modern society, such as
ours, affords the possibility of illegal behavior accompanied by widespread,
diffuse consequences, some procedural means must exist to remedy--or at
least to deter-that conduct.
Weinstein, The Class Action is Not Abusive, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
8. Judge Weinstein's opinion in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484-85,
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), explains and advances this view:
It is the duty of the federal courts to render private enforcement practicable.
2
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1985] THE CLASS ACTION
One major hurdle for any plaintiff class action suit is the cost of
notifying absent class members, prior to any merit determination, of
the pendency of the class suit [hereinafter referred to as "pendency
notice"]. If the class representative must pay the cost of pendency
notice,9 and that cost is high,10 only the wealthy litigant or individ-
uals with large claims will seek redress; the courts will have taken
Other than the class action, the procedures available for handling proliferated
litigation-joinder, intervention, consolidation, and the test case--cannot
serve this function in a situation like the one presented here. These alternative
devices presuppose "a group of economically powerful parties who are obvi-
ously able and willing to take care of their own interests individually through
individual suits or individual decisions about joinder or intervention."
See also Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTrrRUsT L.J.
295, 298 (1966).
The class action is particularly appropriate where those who have allegedly been in-jured "are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know
enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive." Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHt. L. Rnv. 684, 686 (1941). Its
"historic mission" has been to "[take] care of the smaller guy." Statement of Professor
Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, quoted in
Frankel, supra at 299. The California Supreme Court emphasized this view in Vasquez
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal Rptr. 796, 800 (1971),
when it said:
Frequently numerous consumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by
the same seller so that proof of the prevalence of the practice as to one con-
sumer would provide proof for all. Individual actions by each of the de-
frauded consumers is often impracticable because the amount of individual
recovery would be insufficient to justify bringing a separate action; thus an
unscrupulous seller retains the benefits of its wrongful conduct. A class action
by consumers produces several salutary by-products, including a therapeutic
effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices [and] aid to legiti-
mate business enterprise by curtailing illegitimate competition ...
Often statutes award attorney fees to the prevailing party so that private attorneys will
have an incentive to prosecute cases involving important rights and thereby act as pri-
vate attorneys general. The rationale for both the private attorney general provisions
and the deterrent/redress aspect of the plaintiff class action suit are similar. See gener-
ally Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9. The Supreme Court, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Eisen IV], a landmark decision concerning the requirement of pen-
dency notice, paid little attention (less than one paragraph and less than seventy words)
to the crucial issue of which side must pay for the cost of pendency notice when it is
required. The Court merely said, at 178-79:
In the absence of any support under Rule 23, petitioner's effort to impose the
cost of [pendency] notice on respondents must fail. The usual rule is that a
plaintiff must initially bear the cost of [pendency] notice to the class. ....
Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the
plaintiff must pay for the cost of [pendency] notice as part of the ordinary
burden of financing his own suit.
It is clear from the quoted language that the Court's decision was based upon its inter-
pretation of rule 23 rather than the Constitution. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1978).
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1785 (West
1981)), provides that the cost of pendency notice may be born by either the plaintiff or
defendant depending upon certain factors. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1981). This
cost-shifting provision has withstood constitutional scrutiny. Civil Serv. Employees Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 362, 374, 584 P.2d 497, 504, 149 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367
3
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sides by facilitating the preservation of the status quo and closing
their doors to small claimants.11
A perfect, and unfortunate, example of this result is illustrated by
the Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen
IV).12 Plaintiff filed a class action suit on behalf of himself and six
million odd-lot securities purchasers alleging that defendant sell-
ers13 overcharged the class by violating federal antitrust laws.1 4 Af-
ter conducting a preliminary hearing on the merits, the federal
district court judge found that the class would "more than likely"
prevail at trial.15 Despite this finding, the Supreme Court "dis-
miss[ed] the class action" 16 because the named plaintiff would not
pay the $315,000 cost of pendency notice.17 Plaintiff's individual
claim was small, as the Court said:
A critical fact in this litigation is that [plaintiff's] individual stake
in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent attor-
ney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so
inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates that
[plaintiff's] suit proceed as a class action or not at all.' 8
(1978). See generally Comment, Cost Allocation in California Class Actions, 13 CAL.
W.L. REv. 65 (1976).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen IV that plaintiff should bear the
cost of pendency notice is likely to be followed by the states. The Court said its rule was
the usual rule, unaltered by rule 23. Most states have adopted, in some form, the provi-
sions of rule 23. (Twenty-two states have adopted rule 23 in toto; fourteen states have
adopted rule 23 in a modified form; eight states have adopted the 1938 rule 23. 1 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 1, at §§ 1210(b) & 1220(a) (Supp. 1984)). It is, therefore, un-
likely that states will decide differently than the Court on this issue. Indeed, other than
California, only four states permit their courts, under special circumstances, to shift or
allocate part of the cost of pendency notice to either party to the suit (New Jersey, New
York, Oregon and West Virginia). I H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 1220(b) (Supp.
Feb. 1980 and Feb. 1984).
10. In Eisen IV, the Court noted that the cost of pendency notice, at ten cents first
class postage, would be $315,000. Today the cost of first class postage is twenty-two
cents and of course, inflation has greatly added to the cost of printing, paper and stuff-
ing. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 167 n.7.
11. The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has
against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with
the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well
as to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 186 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
12. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
13. The defendants were two brokerage firms dealing on the New York Stock Ex-
change. While it appears that other dealers handled odd-lot purchases, the two defend-
ants "together handled 99% of the Exchange's odd-lot business." Id. at 160. It can
therefore be presumed that the defendants were rich and powerful; individual purchas-
ers, by definition those that purchased less than 100 shares (odd-lot purchases), were
probably not.
14. Id. at 160.
15. Id. at 168.
16. Id. at 179.
17. Id. at 167 n.7, 179.
18. Id. at 161.
[Vol. 22
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The Supreme Court was willing, or perhaps compelled, 19 to de-
prive each class member of a remedy20 in order to ensure that the
absent members received pendency notice.
The unfairness of the result is highlighted by the fact that the
same federal distict court judge, after holding an evidentiary hear-
ing, found that the class was adequately represented. 21 That finding
was never disputed by either the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 22
or the Supreme Court.2 3 Thus, although there was no question that
the absent class members' interests were being adequately repre-
sented, and that without the class action device no absentee would
or could pursue his/her claim, the cost of pendency notice caused
the termination of what appeared to be a meritorious suit against
defendants who bilked millions of people of millions of dollars.24
19. In Eisen IV, the Court held that plaintiff must pay for the cost of pendency
notice as part of the cost of financing the law suit. See supra note 9. Commentators
disagree as to whether or not due process requires plaintiff to pay for the cost of pen-
dency notice. See generally McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection Concepts
and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351
(1974); Note, Recent Developments, Eisen III: Fluid Recovery, Constructive Notice and
Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in Class Action Rejected, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1641 (1973); Note, Allocation of Identification Costs in Class Actions: Sanders v. Levy,
91 HARV. L. REv. 703 (1978).
20. Aside from the Supreme Court recognizing the obvious, it is interesting to note
that plaintiff, in an attempt to avoid the procedural rigors of rule 23(b)(3), tried to
certify the class as a rule 23(b)(1)(A) class. The Court in Eisen IVnoted with approval
that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
[Held subdivision (b)(1)(A) inapplicable on the ground that the prospective
class consisted entirely of small claimants, none of whom could afford to liti-
gate this action in order to recover his individual claim and that consequently
there was little chance of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class. .. ."
Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 163-64 n.4 (citing 28 U.S.C. App. 7766 (Proposed FED. R. Civ. P.
advisory committee notes)). Clearly, by requiring plaintiff to pay for pendency notice,
the Court effectively deprived each individual class member of a remedy against the
defendants.
21. Id. at 165.
22. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Eisen III].
23. Indeed, the Supreme Court properly assumed that the representation was ade-
quate when it rejected one of plaintiff's arguments, that adequate representation in lieu
of pendency notice was sufficient under rule 23. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 177-78. Further,
it should be briefly noted that the federal district court in 1966 dismissed plaintiffs class
suit in part because it feared that Eisen might not fairly and adequately represent the
class. Id. at 162. In Eisen II, the court of appeals reversed the district court indicating
that the district court's reasoning on the adequacy point was erroneous and directing
reconsideration. Id. at 162-63. After that remand, and a full evidentiary hearing, the
district court found that Eisen would fairly and adequately represent the class. Id. at
165. As indicated, neither the court of appeals in Eisen III nor the Supreme Court in
Eisen IV questioned this finding.
24. Eisen claimed between $22,000,000 and $60,000,000 at the start of his action.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265 (1971). However, on appeal, Eisen
raised the estimate to $120,000,000. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1009.
5
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It is the position of this Article that adequate representation of
absent class members, rather than pendency notice to absent class
members, satisfies the due process clause and permits the entry of a
valid binding class judgment. It is argued that such a judgment
conclusively binds the rights of all class members, both present and
absent.
Part I of this Article will discuss the issue of whether or not pen-
dency notice or adequate representation is the constitutional man-
date. Part II will discuss whether or not Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rule 23's requirement of pendency notice to rule 23(b)(3)
class members reflects a constitutional mandate or merely a statu-
tory directive. Part III explores the pendency notice requirement of
rule 23 and the ability of the parties to manipulate the rule so as to
achieve a desired result. Part IV will propose a new rule which,
while comporting with due process safeguards, will also permit the
class device to function as a tool which deters antisocial activity and
provides redress to individuals with small claims. 25
I. ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION VERSUS PENDENCY
NOTICE: WHICH IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE?
A. The Two Leading Contenders: Hansberry v. Lee for
Adequacy of Representation and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. for Pendency
Notice
The arguments concerning what is needed in order to give bind-
ing effect to class action judgments revolve around two Supreme
Court decisions which were decided a decade apart.
In the case of Hansberry v. Lee,26 the Supreme Court held that a
prior class judgment was not binding on the petitioners because
they were not adequately represented in the prior suit.
25. Philosophers may debate whether or not a right exists when no remedy is pro-
vided to redress its violation; the issue is of practical concern to the small claimant. If
procedural rules bar redress as effectively as if no substantive right exists, then realisti-
cally no substantive right can be said to exist. It is clear that the government which
creates substantive rights and procedural roadblocks is only fooling people who cam
least afford the joke. With reference to rights created by the Constitution, Chief Justice
Marshall said: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appella-
tion, if the law furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Whether a constitutional right or any
other right, the rule is the same: if there is no remedy, then no right exists. "In the
whole field of law there is no right without a remedy. . . . [T]he only useful test as to
the existence of a right is that some legal remedy is provided. . . . [W]here no legal
remedy is provided there is neither right nor duty." 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 990
(2d ed. 1964). See also H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 76 (2d ed. 1948).
26. 311 U.S. 32 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Hansberry].
[Vol. 22
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 22 [1985], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss1/3
THE CLASS ACTION
As a method of enforcing segregation in Chicago, restrictive
agreements were utilized to deny homeowners the power to sell
their homes to blacks.27 In 1934, Burke brought suit in the Supe-
rior Court of Cook County on behalf of himself and others, against
Kleiman and three other individuals to enforce the provisions of a
restrictive covenant and thereby restrain defendants from selling to
blacks.28 The restrictive features of the covenant involved were not
effective unless ninety-five percent of the homeowners signed the
agreement.29 Both plaintiffs and defendants stipulated that that
precondition had been satisfied.30 The court found in favor of the
plaintiffs and enforced the agreement.3' Later, the Hansberrys,
who were blacks, purchased a home within the restricted area.3 2
Lee and others brought suit to enjoin the breach.33 The Hansberrys
defended on the ground that the agreement was invalid and unen-
forceable because ninety-five percent of the appropriate homeown-
ers had not signed. Lee pleaded res judicata, claiming that that
issue was finally resolved in Burke v. Kleiman,34 the prior suit.
Since the Hansberrys were not parties to the prior suit,3 5 and had
not received notice of the prior suit, they claimed that to bind them
to the result of that suit denied them due process of law.36 After a
trial on the merits, the trial court found only fifty-four percent, not
the required ninety-five percent, had signed the agreement and that
the only support for the decree in Burke was the false and fraudu-
lent stipulation concerning the ninety-five percent figure. Notwith-
standing this finding, the lower court applied res judicata and the
Hansberrys appealed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the
27. The practice was finally exposed and held unconstitutional in Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
28. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 39. See Burke v. Kleiman, 277 IMI. App. 519 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Burke]. (The case was appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court, Burke v. Kleiman, 355 Ill. 390 (1934), which transferred the case to the court of
appeals where it was affirmed).
29. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37-38.
30. Id. at 38. Actually it appears that the case was tried entirely on stipulated
facts. The only issue presented was whether or not changes in the restricted area ren-
dered the covenant unenforceable. The apparent and rather obvious goal of the litigants
was to establish the covenant's validity so as to assure its continued utility. See infra
note 44 and accompanying text.
31. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
32. Id.
33. Counsel for respondents (Lee and others) argued for a decree ordering specific
performance, requiring that the Hansberrys return the home they purchased and in turn
receive the price they had paid. Id. at 37.
34. Id. at 38. See supra note 28.
35. Id. Nor were the Hansberrys in privity with any of the parties to the prior suit.
36. Id. The Court stated that the petitioners pleaded "that denial of their right to
litigate" was a denial of due process. This, of course, is merely an elliptical way of
stating that they had not received pendency notice. This view is reinforced by the
Court's discussion of the notice issue and by the fact that petitioners' counsel argued
that the Hansberrys had not received "the benefit of notice." Id. at 33.
1985]
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entire record of the Burke case and determined that the controver-
sial stipulation was indeed untrue, but further found that it was not
based upon fraud or collusion. It, therefore, applied the principle of
resjudicata, despite the concededly incorrect decision in Burke, and
affirmed the lower court.37 The Hansberrys then petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review.
Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, began by stating the gen-
eral rules concerning notice and the binding effect of judgments:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American juris-
prudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he
has not been made a party by service of process.. . . [J]udicial
action enforcing [a judgment] against the person or property of
the absent party is not that due process which the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments require.38
However, the Court then specifically recognized the class suit as
an exception to the general rule:39 "To these general rules there is a
recognized exception that . . . the judgment in a 'class' or 'repre-
sentative' suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may
bind members of the class or those represented who were not made
parties to it."4
As to whether adequate representation as opposed to pendency
notice is the key ingredient necessary in obtaining a binding class
judgment, the Court said: "It is familiar doctrine of the federal
courts that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation
may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by parties who are present .... -41
Regarding the issue of adequate representation, the Court stated
that it is one thing to permit representation of a class where the sole
and common interest of the class is to assert a common right or to
challenge an asserted obligation,42 but as the Court said:
37. Id. at 39-40. If the stipulation was merely untrue as opposed to being fraudu-
lent or collusive, then the Illinois Supreme Court's application of res judicata based
upon a case known to be erroneously decided is an example of why Judge Clark admit-
ted in Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion):
"The defense of resjudicata is universally respected, but actually not very well liked."
See generally Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317
(1978).
38. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40-41.
39. Class actions were originally maintained to avoid the rigors of the necessary/
indispensable party rule which required all parties interested in the controversy be
joined. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrrY PLEADINGS §§ 97-135 (2d ed. 1840);
Hazard, supra note 2, at 1266; see also infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
Indeed, even today the class action is excepted from the necessary/indispensable party
rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(d).
40. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41.
41. Id. at 42-43.
42. Id. at 44-45.
[Vol. 22
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It is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively
either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so
that any group, merely because it is of the class so constituted,
may be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class in
litigating their interests in either alternative. 43
The Court reversed.
Perhaps it was the fraudulent aspect of the prior suit, combined
with the nature of the right sought to be enforced, which caused the
Court to employ unnecessarily broad language to effectuate the re-
versal of an obvious injustice.44 Read literally, the Court's language
might easily be interpreted so as to defeat all class actions where
class interests are not joint and thus individual interests could be
43. Id. at 45. On this point and particularly referring to this quoted paragraph,
commentators noted:
[D]oes the Court mean to base its holding on the distinction attempted to be
drawn in the above paragraph? It is submitted it does not, because the distinc-
tion is one without substance. There is no such thing as a class action in
which it can be said that each and every one of the absent members-those
without notice of the proceedings-wishes the representatives of the class to
assert a right in his behalf.
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben-Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 338 (1948). As
an example of the difficulty in finding the shining line which the Court attempts to
draw, the authors cite the earlier Supreme Court case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), which was cited with approval in Hansberry. In Ben-Hur,
the Tribe, a fraternal organization, was going broke and could not pay off benefits it had
promised its members. In an attempt to solve this problem, it undertook a reorganiza-
tion which required one group of insureds to pay premiums at a different rate than
another group of insureds. After reorganization, plaintiffs, all non-residents of Indiana,
for themselves and the other members in their group, sued the Tribe, an Indiana corpo-
ration, requesting the Indiana federal district court enjoin the reorganization. After a
hearing on the merits, the district court ruled against the class and dismissed the suit.
Almost five years later, Indiana members of the class filed suits in the Indiana state
court seeking to challenge the same reorganization plan. The Tribe then sought an
injunction from the Indiana federal district court so as to prevent relitigation of what
was settled by that district court's decree. The Hoosiers argued that they were not
members of the class because their presence in the prior suit would have ousted the
court of diversity jurisdiction. The Indiana federal district court agreed; on appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that absent, non-diverse class members fell
within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal court and thus did not oust the district
court of diversity jurisdiction. The rights of the absentees, according to the Court, were
concluded by the prior decree. The Court did not discuss the very likely possibility that
some members of the class would prefer to pay a bit more in premiums rather than
possibly cause the Tribe to become insolvent and thus lose everything. See infra note 45
and accompanying text.
44. After trial, the lower court found the stipulation was fraudulent: The Illinois
Supreme Court found that it was untrue. Plaintiffs and defendants in the prior suit had
stipulated to all facts and tried only one issue. Everything pointed toward a collusive
lawsuit brought to secure the continued validity of the restrictive covenant, see supra
note 30, but the Supreme Court had to accept the Illinois Supreme Court's findings.
The Supreme Court's soon to be realized distaste for the enforcement of restrictive con-
venants (see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1945), supra note 27), coupled with the
restrictions placed upon the Court by the Illinois Supreme Court's findings, may explain
why the Court was compelled to use the language employed to reverse. See Weinstein,
Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 460
(1960).
1985]
9
Weiner: The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
divergent. For instance, in a taxpayers' or ratepayers' suit to enjoin
the operation of a nuclear power plant, it is obvious, given our polit-
ical divisions on the subject, that not all class members wish to en-join such activity. A class suit brought to compel desegregation by
the use of busing may certainly include class members who do not
want their children bused to a particular place or who do not want
desegregation. 45 Yet, such suits and others like them are common
class suits in the federal courts. 46 In such circumstances, subclasses
may be utilized to accommodate differing interests4 7 or the defend-
ant can be said to properly represent those interests not represented
by the class representatives. 48
The pendency notice argument was given a big boost in 1950
when the Supreme Court decided Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
45. In such a suit, one of the lawyers representing the plaintiff class felt the conflict
so strongly that he eventually withdrew from representation. Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470 (1976).
46. Rule 23(b)(2) class actions (Title VII antidiscrimination actions), have by far
been "the most popular type of class action under the present Federal Rule 23." 1 H.
NEWBERO, supra note 1, at § 1145.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) provides: "When appropriate (A) an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly."
As Professors Wright and Miller explain:
The usual situation in which a court will divide a class into subclasses under
Rule 23(c)(4)(B) is when the class is found to have members whose interests
are divergent or antagonistic. The court may group members into nearly ho-
mogeneous subclasses, thereby separating adverse as well as atypical members.
But a class need not be subdivided merely because different groups within it
have alternative legal theories for recovery or because they have different fac-
tual bases for seeking relief.
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1790.
48. The Supreme Court in Hansberry said as much, but because the defendants in
the prior suit were only nominal at best, the Court did not apply this principle to the
case. In countering respondent's argument on the point, the Court approved of the
principle in appropriate cases. The Court said:
The defendants in the first suit were not treated by the pleadings or decree as
representing others or as foreclosing by their defense the rights of others; and,
even though nominal defendants, it does not appear that their interest in de-
feating the contract outweighed their interest in establishing its validity. For a
court in this situation to ascribe to either the plaintiffs or defendants the per-
formance of such functions on behalf of petitioners here, is to attribute to
them a power that it cannot be said that they had assumed to exercise, and
responsibility which, in view of their dual interests it does not appear that they
could rightly discharge.
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 46.
In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, supra note 43, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), the
Supreme Court applied resjudicata to bind the Hoosiers to a prior class judgment. In
doing so, the Court presumed that the plaintiff class which consisted of 574 members
from 15 states and Canada, although losing, adequately represented the Hoosiers; of
course, any Hoosier who did not want the reorganization challenged could properly be
viewed as being adequately represented by the Tribe which, unlike the defendants in
Burke v. Kleiman, was literally fighting for its very survival. See supra note 43.
10
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& Trust Co.,49 a case which was not filed as a class action suit. In
Mullane, the New York Banking Law had provided trustees with
authority to place various trusts in a common trust fund, thereby
achieving the advantages of diversification of risk and economy in
management.50 Within a specified time after establishing the com-
mon trust fund, the trustee was required to petition the New York
court for the settlement of accounts of all persons interested in the
fund.51 Both residents and non-residents were beneficiaries of the
fund,52 which included income, principal and contingent benefi-
ciaries.53 At the appropriate time, the trustee petitioned the court
for the settlement of accounts. Pursuant to the New York Banking
Law, the court appointed two guardians, one to represent all the
income beneficiaries and one to represent all those interested in the
principal.54 Notice of the settlement proceeding was provided by
newspaper publication in compliance with the Banking Law. 55 The
guardians were present at the settlement proceeding; no beneficiary
appeared. 56 The court purported to enter a decree which had the
effect of terminating "every right which beneficiaries would other-
wise have against the trust company. . . for improper management
of the common trust fund during the period covered by the
[action]. ' '57
The question before the Court was "the constitutional sufficiency
of notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts. .... ,,58
49. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Mullane]. An earlier Supreme Court
case just barely hinted at the problem. See Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S.
38, 58 (1908), where Justice Moody, in language that was not merely unnecessary to the
decision but adverse to it suggested inter alia that a prior "class action" could not bind
absentees because "some possibly had never heard of the pendency of the suit". Later,
explaining the rejection of the class suit in Wabash, the Supreme Court never mentioned
pendency notice or the lack thereof, but rather stated that Wabash stood for the simple
notion that merely saying a suit is a class suit does not make it such: "That allegation,
of course, would not by itself determine the character of the proceeding." Hartford Life
Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1915) (citing Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College,
208 U.S. at 58).
50. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 308-09.
51. Id. at 309.
52. Id. Although there were 113 trusts involved, "[tihe record [did] not show the
number or residence of beneficiaries, but they were many and it is clear that some of
them were not residents of the State of New York." Id.
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 311. Of course, every court hopes to finally adjudicate the dispute before
it so as to avoid needless repetition and waste of time, effort and resources. However, it
is universally recognized that only a second court reviewing a prior decision is permit-
ted to determine whether or not the first proceeding is binding. See generally Cleary,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948). Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
58. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, actually
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Another issued raised and discussed by the Court was "the right of
[the New York] courts to adjudicate at all as against those benefi-
ciaries who reside[d] without the State of New York."5 9
As to this latter issue, the Court recognized that the New York
proceeding had some characteristics of, and yet was wanting in
some features of, proceedings both in rem and in personam.60 With-
out attempting to label the action or employ traditional terminol-
ogy, the Court held:
It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition
of its chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing
means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are
administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its
courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or non-
resident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to ap-
pear and be heard.61
framed the issue as follows: "This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency
of notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common
trust fund established under the New York Banking Law." Id.
The fact that the "trust fund established under the New York Banking Law" was in
question is significant in light of the Court's recognition that 31 other jurisdictions had
adopted such legislation. Those jurisdictions might have been more interested in at-
tracting funds and/or business for their resident trustees than in protecting the rights of
the beneficiaries of those funds. Indeed, New York since World War I, has been the
financial center of the world. See W. GREENLEAF, AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT SINCE 1860, at 357 (1968). In competing for funds to feed investments, New
York may have been less concerned with beneficiaries and more concerned with its own
trust companies. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
59. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311. By separating the two issues the Court itself recog-
nized that notice without the compulsion to appear or vice versa is insufficient to re-
quire a defendant's appearance. See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 n.40
(1977).
60. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312. Since the proceeding compelled the trustees to ap-
pear and account for a fund within the jurisdiction of the court, it appeared to be a
proceeding in rem, quasi-in-rem and in the nature of a proceeding in rem. However,
since the rights of the beneficiaries against the trustees for misfeasance and/or malfea-
sance extended beyond the fund which was before the court and to the trustees person-
ally, the proceeding looked more like an in personam proceeding than any other, if any
other at all. As the court said in ShatTer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 199:
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person,
the action and judgment are denominated "in personam" and can impose a
personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is
based on the court's power over property within its territory, the action is
called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of a judgment in such a case is
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a per-
sonal liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court.
61. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. The Court did not cite any authority whatsoever for
its position. Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 734-35, left little room for any
growth in jurisdictional concepts although he did go to pains "[t]o prevent any misap-
plication of the views expressed in the opinion" to state: "Nor do we doubt that a State,
on creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may
provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced,
or their charters revoked, which shall not require other than personal service upon their
officers or members." Justice Field was obviously speaking of a suit by others against
[Vol. 22
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On the main issue, the notice issue, the Court held that the notice
provided did not meet constitutional standards of due process: "An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections." 62
The Court concluded that as to those beneficiaries whose names
and addresses were known to the trustees, those with whom the
trustee regularly communicated, individual mailed notice was re-
quired. As to unknown and conjectural beneficiaries, the statutory
(publication) notice was sufficient.63
B. Distinctions Between Mullane and the Plaintiff Class Suit
Since Mullane is the germinal case regarding the constitutional
requirement of notice, and the case most often advanced as requir-
ing pendency notice to absent class members,64 it is appropriate to
point out the distinctions between Mullane and the plaintiff class
action suit,65 distinctions which justify pendency notice in the for-
mer situation but not in the latter.
In Mullane, three different types of conflict of interest existed,
none of which exist in the plaintiff class suit:
CONFLICT I - In Mullane, there was a conflict of interest
among the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries interested in income are not
interested in principal; income beneficiaries' interests are adverse to
the principal and contingent beneficiaries' interests. Such a conflict
the corporation within the state of incorporation, not, as in Mullane, a suit by the cor-
poration (trust) against others in the state of incorporation (the state that created the
trust).
62. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Compare the language of Justice Field in Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720, where in 1877 he stated that the territorial power theory of
jurisdiction "express[ed] a principle of general, if not universal, law." Confined and
intimidated by such overpowering rhetoric, the courts struggled for 100 years, establish-
ing fiction upon fiction so as not to offend that universal principle. See Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Dencla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958); Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REv. 657 (1959); Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978). Finally, in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. at 196, "the continued soundness of the conceptual structure founded on
the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff". . . was reviewed and found wanting. Uni-
versal and fundamental principles, when announced by the Supreme Court, are difficult
to discard.
63. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18.
64. See infra notes 103-153 and accompanying text.
65. Although this Article is primarily concerned with plaintiff class action suits,
Part IV of this Article will suggest a rule concerning pendency notice which will apply
to all class suits, including defendant class suits.
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may not be hospitable to class resolution. 66
CONFLICT II-In Mullane, there was a conflict of interest be-
tween the beneficiaries and their guardians. The Court in Mullane
insisted that two factors combined to trigger the pendency notice
requirement. One factor was that the beneficiaries' "interests are
. ..subject to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees
and expenses to [the guardian] who, in their names, but without
their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory con-
test."' 67 Unlike the class suit, the guardians were not hired by their
clients, but rather appointed by the court. 68 Since no beneficiary
66. Professor Scott explains the conflict between these beneficiaries and the di-
lemma it poses for a trustee, such as the trustee in Mullane:
Where there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a
duty to deal impartially with them. This principle has its commonest applica-
tion where there are successive beneficiaries. Where the trustee is directed to
pay the income to a beneficiary during his life and on his death to pay the
principal to another beneficiary, the interests of the two beneficiaries are to a
certain extent antagonistic, and the trustee is under a duty so to administer the
trust as to preserve a fair balance between them. He is under a duty to the
former beneficiary to take care not merely to preserve the trust property but to
make it productive so that a reasonable income will be available for him. He
is under a duty to the latter beneficiary to take care to preserve the principal of
the trust property for him. He is not under a duty to the beneficiary entitled
to risk the safety of the principal in order to produce a larger income, but he is
under a duty to him not to sacrifice income for the purpose of increasing the
value of the principal. Thus, he is under a duty to the beneficiary entitled to
the income not to purchase unproductive property or property which yields an
income substantially lower than that which is normally earned by trust invest-
ments although it may be probable that the property will appreciate in value.
On the other hand, he is under a duty to the beneficiary who is ultimately
entitled to the principal not to purchase property which is certain or likely to
depreciate in value, although the property yields a large income. Similarly if
the trust property at the creation of the trust includes wasting or unproductive
property, the trustee is ordinarily under a duty to dispose of such property.
A. Scorr, LAW OF TRUSTS, § 232 (3d ed. 1967). See also infra note 75.
67. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
68. In Mullane, the New York court, pursuant to the New York Banking Law
§ 100-C(12), appointed the guardians. Id. at 310. It is typical where trust funds are
involved for the court to appoint guardians to protect all the various interests. 39 C.J.S.
Guardian and Ward § 17 (1976). It is quite a different thing to represent the interests of
a client while hired or appointed by a third party, than when the attorney is directly
accountable to the client. On this subject, canon 5 of the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility (MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT
Canon 5 (amended 1982)) [hereinafter cited as Old ABA] states that "A Lawyer Should
Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." This canon is
backed up by both disciplinary rules [hereinafter cited as DR] and ethical considera-
tions [hereinafter cited as EC]. DR 5-107 provides in part:
DR 5-107 Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client.
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall
not:
(1) Accept compensation for his legal services from one other than his
client.
(2) Accept from one other than his client anything of value related to his
representation of or his employment by his client.
(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
14
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appeared, the guardians never consulted with their clients concern-
ing their clients' wishes nor did they report to their clients concern-
ing the progress of the case.69 Hence, the guardians in Mullane
who did not report to any client were paid fees and costs regardless
of results, whereas attorneys in a plaintiff class suit are in continu-
ous contact with their clients and are paid fees and reimbursed costs
only in the event of success. 70 The plaintiff class attorney's haterest
him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional
judgment in rendering such legal services.
The relevant EC's state in part:
Desires of Third Persons
EC 5-21 The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on
behalf of his client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might
impair his free judgment. The desires of a third person will seldom adversely
affect a lawyer unless that person is in a position to exert strong economic,
political, or social pressures upon the lawyer. These influences are often sub-
tle, and a lawyer must be alert to their existence.
EC 5-22 Economic, political, or social pressures by third persons are less
likely to impinge upon the independent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in
which he is compensated directly by his client and his professional work is
exclusively with his client. On the other hand, if a lawyer is compensated
from a source other than his client, he may feel a sense of responsibility to
someone other than his client (footnotes omitted).
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct are virtually iden-
tical. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.4(c) (adopted 1983) [hereinafter
cited as New ABA].
Aside from the inherent conflict problem, a competence problem may exist. Those
appointed by the court may not have the experience necessary for effective representa-
tion (see Lewis v. State Bar of Cal., 28 Cal. 3d 683, 621 P.2d 258, 170 Cal. Rptr. 634
(1981)) or the time to devote to the case (see Lopez v. Larson, 91 Cal. App. 2d 383, 400
153 Cal. Rptr. 912, 922 (1979)). Worst yet are attorneys appointed as guardians who
answer to no client and are paid regardless of success, because such attorneys will most
likely not wish to vigorously protect their client's interest if to do so will distress the
court that made the lucrative appointment.
69. The Court stated that "[n]ot even the special guardian is required or apparently
expected to communicate with his ward and client. ... Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.
The New ABA, supra note 68, rule 1.4 specifically requires communication concern-
ing the status and progress of the case. New ABA rule 1.4 provides: "(a) A lawyer
shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly com-
ply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation." In the plaintiff class suit, the attorney for the class is ethically
required to consult and report to his/her client(s).
70. Many federal courts have stated that a highly relevant factor in establishing
fees for plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions is "the contingent nature of the fees, with
the accompanying risk of wasting hours of work, overhead and expenses (for it is clearly
established that compensation is awarded only in the event of success)." Angoff v.
Goldfind, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959). See also Freeman v. Ryan, 408 F.2d 1204,
1206 (D.C. Cir. 1968); McKittrick v. Gardner, 378 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir. 1967); Har-
ris v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 197 F.2d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 1952); Newmark v. RKO
Gen., Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX LITIGATION § 1.47(b)(2) (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL] which fed-
eral courts are increasingly relying upon in determining attorney fees. 1 and 4 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 1, at §§ 1120n and 7518j; Smith, Standards for Judicial Approval
of Attorneys' Fees in Class Action and Complex Litigation, 20 How. L.J. 20 (1977).
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and the interest of the plaintiff class are the same.71 Thus, the in-
tent of the attorney is to avoid fruitless contest and vigorously advo-
cate the interest of the plaintiff class so that both may be
compensated. Moreover, unlike Mullane where the trust assets
were available to pay for the costs of suit, in the plaintiff class suit
the named plaintiff or the plaintiff class is ultimately responsible for
71. Both the attorney for the class and the class can only be compensated in the
event of success. The conflicts, if any, are minimized or eliminated by a variety of rules
and decisions on the subject. The MANUAL, supra note 70, § 1.46, at 66, states that fees
should be negotiated separately from class recovery because "[w]hen counsel for the
class negotiates simultaneously for the settlement fund and for individual counsel fees,
there is an inherent conflict of interest."
Further and more importantly, an attorney is disqualified from representing the class
if there is a chance that a conflict exists between the attorney and the class. Hence, an
attorney is disqualified if the attorney:
(1) Attempts to act as both class attorney and class representative, see Second Cir-
cuit: Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1980); Davidson v. Yeshiva
Univ., 555 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Housler v. First Nat'l Bank of E. Islip, 524
F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 56 F.R.D. 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Third Circuit: Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085,
1090 (3d Cir. 1976); Charal v. Andes, 81 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Hedges Enter. v.
Continental Group, 81 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Residex Corp. v. Farrow, 20 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 97 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592
(M.D. Pa. 1974). Fourth Circuit: Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48
(M.D.N.C. 1976). Fifth Circuit: Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014
(5th Cir. 1981); Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 574 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir.
1978); Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978). Sixth Circuit:
Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976). Seventh Circuit: Susman v. Lincoln
Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 57
F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Eighth Circuit: Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D.
25 (S.D. Iowa 1972). Ninth Circuit: In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.
1974); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972).
(2) Is related to the class representative, see Second Circuit: Cohen v. Bloch, 507 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Fischer v. IT&T Corp., 72 F.R.D. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Dennis v. Saks & Co., 20 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Stull v. Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Third Circuit: Lewis v. Goldsmith, 95 F.R.D. 15 (D.N.J. 1982); Bogus v. An.
Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 859 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Som-
mers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. S. & L. Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Seventh
Circuit: Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D., 1 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Ninth Circuit: In re
Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Shields v. First Nat'1 Bank of Ariz., 56
F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665 (D. Ariz. 1978).
3) Has a business relationship with the class representative, see Second Circuit:
Brick v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 547 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1976); Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D.
341 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Third Circuit: Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d
1085 (3d Cir. 1976). Fifth Circuit: Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th
Cir. 1978); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 70 F.R.D. 608 (D. Minn. 1976).
4) Is a member of the class, see District of Columbia: Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F.
Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977). Third Circuit: Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d
1085 (3d Cir. 1976). Seventh Circuit: Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp:, 561 F.2d 86 (7th
Cir. 1977). Ninth Circuit: In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974);
Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972).
Many of these cases suggest that the reason for disqualification is to assure that the
class will not place blind reliance on the attorney so that the class's interest is respected.
See cases collected and cited in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157
(5th Cir. 1978).
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costs,72 (although in the event the plaintiff class loses, the attorney
for the class rarely seeks reimbursement for costs advanced and
merely suffers the lOSS). 73
CONFLICT III-In Mullane, there was a conflict between the
trustee and its beneficiaries. The other factor stated by the Mullane
court for requiring pendency notice to the beneficiaries was that the
judicial settlement proceeding "cut off their rights to have the
trustee answer for negligent or illegal" acts concerning their inter-
ests.74 Ordinarily beneficiaries expect that their trustee, their care-
taker, will care for and protect their interest,75 yet "it is their
caretaker who in the accounting [became] their adversary. ' 76 This
expectation was particularly strong in Mullane because the trustee
periodically communicated with the beneficiaries, thereby inducing
a reasonable expectation that the trustee would continue to protect
their interest unless otherwise notified. Unlike Mullane, in the
72. The Old ABA supra note 68 is clearly on point. DR 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litiga-
tion, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client,
except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, in-
cluding court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examina-
tion, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client
remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
The New ABA supra note 68, rule 1.8(e) appears to comport with reality (see infra
note 73). It states in part:
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(I) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repay-
ment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and ex-
penses of litigation on behalf of the client.
One commentator interpreted proposed rule 1.8(e), prior to its adoption, to mean that
a lawyer could pay for litigation costs only if the lawyer was serving without a fee. The
commentator argued that it is unclear whether repayment is contingent only on recov-
ery of costs or must be contingent on prevailing on the merits. It is too early to predict
how the language will be construed, and there is no explanation in the commentary to
the rule. Yet, the very ambiguity of the wording may mean that the drafters did not
intend a strict construction. Lynch, Ethical Rules in Flux: Advancing Costs of Litiga-
tion, 7 LrIGATION 19, 21 (Winter 1981).
It should be noted, however, that as of this writing only New Jersey, Arizona and
Pennsylvania have adopted the New ABA Rules. L.A. Daily Journal, Dec. 7, 1984, at
1, col. 2.
73. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and Class Ac-
tions, 36 Bus. LAWYER 1667, 1671 (1981).
74. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
75. The trustee is under a duty to beneficiaries to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries. Further, in dealing with the beneficiaries on the trustee's
own account, the trustee has a duty to deal fairly and to communicate to the benefi-
ciaries all facts regarding the transaction. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRuSTs § 170
(1959). See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.
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plaintiff class suit the action is prosecuted by the class for the bene-
fit of the class rather than by the class's trustee against the class.
Other significant distinctions exist:
(1) Mullane was not a class suit.77 Indeed, the Court by ordering
pendency notice converted the suit to a defendant class suit. In
Mullane, the plaintiff trustee bank brought suit against the guardi-
ans as representatives of the beneficiaries. If the Court had not per-
formed the metamorphosis, then plaintiff alone would have been
permitted to choose the representatives for the defendant class. As
Professor Chafee said, "It is a strange situation where one side picks
out the generals for the enemy's army."' 78 Indeed, perhaps plaintiff
should never be permitted to choose the opponents' representa-
tives.79 In order to avoid this result, the Court ordered pendency
notice, emphasizing that enough beneficiaries would receive actual
77. No class certification procedure was ever utilized because no class member ever
appeared in the action. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
78. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 1, at 237.
79. In Richardson v. Kelly, 191 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 798
(1947), an insurance company was adjudged insolvent and Kelly was appointed as its
receiver. Each of the 3200 members were severally liable for the debts of the company.
Kelly first sued 200 members for a large sum of money, but when they began to put up a
vigorous fight, Kelly dismissed without prejudice. He then filed a second suit against 28
members and all others similarly situated. None of the original 200 members were
named as defendants. Of the 28 named, 21 were liable for less than $200.00 and the
highest possible liability was only $800.00, while the possible liability to unnamed mem-
bers was many thousands of dollars each. No notice was provided unnamed members.
Prior to trial, the action against two named members was dismissed, six defaulted, and
seventeen paid and/or settled; only three proceeded. The judgment went for the re-
ceiver. Notice of appeal was filed by three named defendants; two then settled favora-
bly, and the other, who owed only $18.00, failed to perfect the appeal. The judgment
became final. Later, two of the original 200 filed suit to vacate the judgment. They
alleged lack of actual or constructive notice and claimed that Kelly purposely chose the
particular named defendants because they had little incentive to defend and/or little
resources to properly defend, i.e., inadequate representation. The Texas courts upheld
the judgment as a valid class judgment binding on the absentees and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. The plain unfairness of the procedure, if not the result (see Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 1, at 242) is possibly the reason for both the Court's decision in
Mullane and rule 23's notice requirements concerning the (b)(3) class. The advisory
committee notes to rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 95 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ACN], when
speaking to the issue of notice, refer to commentators who criticize the Richardson deci-
sion. These commentators suggest that such a result would have been avoided if pen-
dency notice was provided the class. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 1, at 239-42; Note,
Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061, 1064 (1954); Note, Fed-
eral Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 829
(1946). The case has caused a great deal of criticism, aside from that noted by the
ACN, supra. See Jaworski and Padgett, The Class Action in Texas: An Examination
and a Proposal, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1005, 1018 (1975); Starrs, The Consumer Class Ac-
tion-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 487 (1969); VanDer-
creek, The "Is" and "Ought" of Class Action Under Federal Rule 23, 48 IOWA L. REv.
273, 278 (1963); Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REv. 905,
945 (1962); Note, Due Process Requirements of a State Class Action, 55 YALE L.J. 831
(1946); Note, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEx. L. REv.
64(1946).
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notice so that some might appear and protect the interest of the
others as against both the trustees and the guardians.80 Since the
New York law purported to bind all beneficiaries, as if it were a
defendant class action, Mullane merely sought to assure that a suffi-
cient number of interested parties would appear so that the interests
of all would be protected.81 Unlike the danger presented to the ab-
sent defendant class members in Mullane, the absent class members
in a plaintiff class action are fully protected by the plaintiff class
representative and the plaintiff class attorney who have only one
interest: to pursue the action vigorously on behalf of the class so
that all may be compensated.8 2
(2) In Mullane, jurisdiction (the power to adjudicate) was based
on New York's creation of the common trust fund mechanism. The
economy of investment envisioned by the fund would have been de-
stroyed if the trustee were required to sue each beneficiary in each
state or country in which each was domiciled. In competing for
trust funds with other states, the state's interest in encouraging the
use of New York state trustees had to be restrained so as to protect
the beneficiaries.8 3 And, while it is true that notice by itself lacks
the compulsion to appear, nonetheless, when the basis of jurisdic-
tion turns on necessity rather than established theories of jurisdic-
tion, it is proper to presume that notice, the second ingredient
necessary in obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant, will be more
strongly assessed. 84 Indeed, it is even doubtful that a plaintiff or
80. "Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in ob-
jecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would
inure to the benefit of all." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
81. Whether a plaintiff can ever constitutionally choose class representatives for a
defendant class, even assuming adequate representation and appropriate notice, is dis-
cussed in Van Dercreek, supra note 79, at 278. See also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 1, at § 1770. But see United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La.
1969) where the district court permitted the government to file a defendant class action
alleging racial discrimination in the operation of bars and cocktail lounges, so long as all
class members were notified.
82. The plaintiff, the litigant that takes the initiative in filing the class suit, is likely
to pursue it or not file the suit at all; it is the defendant that is the involuntary litigant.
This distinction has been advanced as a safeguard to litigants in those jurisdictions
which have abandoned the concept of mutuality of collateral estoppel. Those jurisdic-
tions tend to place great weight on whether or not the litigant against whom collateral
estoppel is used had the initiative in the prior proceeding, thereby assuring that that
litigant had a full and fair hearing on the issues involved. See Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Cur-
rie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965). In Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected Professor
Currie's "initiative test" as a rule of thumb, but acknowledged that it was an important
factor in adjudging whether or not to permit a stranger to use collateral estoppel against
a litigant who was a party at a prior proceeding. See infra note 282.
83. The Court listed 31 jurisdictions which had adopted similar legislation con-
cerning common trust funds. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 308 n. See supra note 58.
84. In Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld a non-
1985]
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defendant class representative can confer jurisdiction over the class
in a foreign forum without consent, authorization or service of
process.8 5
resident motorist long-arm statute, which implied that the non-resident motorist con-
sented to service of process upon the registrar of motor vehicles should an accident
occur while the non-resident was using the forum's highways. The statute read in part:
"[P]rovided, that notice of such service and a copy of process are forthwith sent by
registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt and
the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the writ and entered
with the declaration." Id. at 354. The Court upheld the statute based on the forum
state's need to protect its residents from such dangerous and mobile instruments of
destruction as automobiles. The Court was willing to stretch its view of both the mean-
ing of the privileges and immunity clause of the Constitution, and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877), but only because actual notice was mandated by the statute. Cf.
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928), where the Supreme Court invalidated a
similar New Jersey non-resident motorist statute because it did not expressly require
that notice be provided to the defendant even though the defendant in that case actually
did receive notice.
Further, notice requirements have been strictly applied whenever the state is the liti-
gant involved. In Mullane, the state created the entity and accounting procedure and
notice was strictly scrutinized. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1962),
the state sought to condemn defendant's property providing only published notice. The
Court held that the notice to defendants by the state was insufficient. Most recently,
the Court held that when the state conducts any proceeding that affects a legally pro-
tected property interest of any party (e.g., a mortgagee's interest), the state must pro-
vide actual notice if the identity and location of the party is reasonably ascertainable.
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
Perhaps more importantly, since Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court
has required that the non-resident defendant expect to be "haled before a [foreign]
court." Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. at 216). This standard was reiterated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 2183 (1985). See generally Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long
Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 156 (1982). This expectation, in the usual case, is
supplied by defendant's contacts with the foreign forum. Yet, in Mullane it is the state's
interest that supplies the basis for jurisdiction rather than the beneficiaries' contacts. In
such a case, it is only fair that the state be required to assure that notice be provided to
the defendant beneficiaries.
85. In a case where the res, the subject of the dispute, was not before the court, the
Supreme Court refused to bind non-resident absentees to a judgment which went
against a defendant class. In Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938), decided
just prior to the adoption of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FED. R. Civ.
P. 308 U.S. 645 (1939)), creditors of an Illinois bank filed suit in the Illinois federal
district court naming the bank and its stockholders as defendants. The Illinois district
court found the bank to be insolvent and the stockholders were assessed a statutory
liability. The creditors then filed suit in the Ohio federal district court against defend-
ants who were stockholders of the bank but who were not served with process in the
Illinois action and were non-residents of Illinois. The creditors claimed that the prior
Illinois decree was binding on these stockholders. The Supreme Court stated that the
obligation imposed was "personal" and that the stockholders "can be held to respond to
it only by a suit maintained in a court having jurisdiction to render a judgment against
them in personam." Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. at 502. Without ever refer-
ring to whether the stockholders were adequately represented, the Court explained that
a stockholder consents to representation by a corporation either when (1) a statute
warns the stockholder of such a procedure, or (2) the rules governing the corporation
do so. In the case before the Court, neither applied. Id. at 504. The Court distin-
guished prior Supreme Court class action cases which were held binding on absentees,
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(3) It should be noted that while the Court in Mullane ordered
notice, which was reasonably likely to reach interested parties, it
continuously emphasized that the notice requirement was limited
both by the nature of the case and the expense of the endeavor.8 6
The trust fund itself was available to pay the cost of notice, yet the
Court, mindful of the nature of the case (common trust fund aimed
at economy), did not require personal service of process, the best
method of notifying beneficiaries.8 7 Rather, the less expensive
mailed notice88 was ordered, and even then the ordered notice was
limited to those beneficiaries that the trustee could easily, with little
cost and effort, identify.89 Moreover, and perhaps most significant,
was the fact that the trust fund contained three million dollars and
involved a small number of beneficiaries with large claims.90 The
plaintiff class suit, with which we are particularly concerned, has no
fund from which to pay for pendency notice and involves large
numbers of victims, each with small claims.
(4) In a class action the court must determine early on, as part of
the class certification motion, whether or not the class is adequately
represented and only then may the action proceed as a class ac-
tion.91 In Mullane, although no hearing took place, it was obvious
by stating that in those cases the res was before the court rendering the judgment,
whereas in Christopher the creditors were seeking an in personam judgment. It is clear
that for the Court, consent to corporate representation included consent to personal
jurisdiction whereas adequate representation had nothing to do with consent to personal
jurisdiction. Therefore it is understandable why the Court had to and did discuss the
consent issue (that by itself could bind the absentees), and it is likewise understandable
why the Court did not discuss adequacy of representation (since that by itself would not
confer personal jurisdiction).
It is important to note that in both Christopher and Mullane the action was in per-
sonam (see supra note 60 and accompanying text) and the absentees were defendants,
not other members of a plaintiff class. In both, the Supreme Court refused to bind the
absentees.
86. The Court used the word "practical" or its equivalent eighteen times and
stressed that "due regard for practicalities and peculiarities of the case" is necessary in
determining whether "constitutional requirements are satisfied." Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314-15.
87. As the Court stated "[w]e need not weigh contentions that a requirement of
personal service of citation on even the large number of known resident or nonresident
beneficiaries would, by reasons of delay if not of expense, seriously interfere with the
proper administration of the fund." Id. at 318-19.
88. The Court's statement that "the mails today are recognized as an. . .inexpen-
sive means of communication," id. at 319, is no longer true. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
89. Keeping in mind the cost involved and the nature of the proceeding, the Court
did not require what might have been a costly search for the names and addresses of all
beneficiaries. On this point, the Court said: "Whatever searches might be required in
another situation under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the character of the
proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think them unnecessary."
Id. at 317.
90. Id. at 309.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides that: "As soon as practicable after the coin-
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that the class, i.e., the beneficiaries, were not adequately repre-
sented.92 It was also clear, due to the practicality of expense, that
an accounting of all interests had to take place in one forum or not
at all. In other words, necessity called for resolution of the matter
in one forum.93 Hence, notice to the beneficiaries permitted the
Court to presume that some would protect all and therefore the
class would be adequately represented.
(5) A class action is strictly controlled by the court and no settle-
ment or compromise may occur without court approval.94 Nothing
in the New York Banking Law required or encouraged such
control.95
Despite the clear language of Hansberry and other prior Supreme
Court decisions, 96 and the features of Mullane which distinguish it
mencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained."
In order to be maintained as a class action, rule 23(a) provides certain prerequisites.
Specifically, rule 23(a)(4) provides that: "the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). For state
equivalents see supra note 8.
This is not to say that merely finding that the adequate representation prerequisite to
the maintenance of a class action is satisfied is sufficient to bind absent class members to
the class judgment. A finding of adequate representation under rule 23(a)(4) does not
preclude a later suit attacking the binding effect of the class judgment on the basis of
inadequate representation. The requirement of adequate representation as a prerequi-
site is intended to ensure satisfaction of due process concerns so that a class judgment
can be held binding if later attacked, thereby avoiding needless relitigation. Of course,
whether the absentee has been adequately represented throughout the class action litiga-
tion is always open for review. See infra note 110.
92. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
94. Because of the representative nature of a class action, the court has more
control over it than over ordinary actions, and must assume "a more active
role than it normally does." Rule 23(d), added in 1966, spells out in some
detail the flexible powers the court has over the conduct of the action. The
action may not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise must be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs (footnotes omitted).
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 486 (4th ed. 1983).
95. In New York, the lower court fully discussed the provisions of the New York
Banking Law. In re Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1947).
96. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (see supra note 43);
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662
(1915) (see supra note 49). All these cases held (although in Smith it was dictum), that
absentees are bound by a class judgment so long as the class was adequately repre-
sented. Hartford is a particularly sharp example.
The facts of Hartford are simple enough. The insurance company set up a Mortuary
Fund from which life insurance benefits would be paid. Members, such as Ibs, were
required to pay assessments properly levied by the insurance company. Ibs was assessed
$35.95, which he did not pay. Shortly thereafter, he died and his wife claimed death
benefits against the fund. The insurance company denied the benefits because of Ibs's
failure to pay the $35.95, The plaintiff/widow brought suit in a Minnesota state court
claiming that the assessment was improperly levied and, therefore, nonpayment by Ibs
was excused. In defense, the company set up a decree rendered by the Connecticut
court which adjudged that the company properly made the assessment. The plaintiff/
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from the plaintiff class action suit, many federal courts had applied
Mullane to all types of class action suits, 9 7 ordering the plaintiff
class to pay for and provide some type of pendency notice to absent
class members.98
C. Does Mullane's Notice Requirement Extend to All Class
Actions Under the Federal Rules?
1. A History of Confusion: After Mullane But Before Eisen IV
and Its Progeny.-To be maintainable as a class action in the federal
courts, a suit must meet all the requirements set forth in rule 23(a) 99
and fall within one of the three subsections of rule 23(b).100 Fur-
widow objected on the ground that she was not a party to the Connecticut proceeding.
The Minnesota trial court sustained the objection, directed a verdict in the plaintiff/
widow's favor and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. In the prior Connecticut
action thirty-one members, all residing in different states, brought a class action against
the insurance company. The suit claimed that various assessments levied by the com-
pany, including the Ibs assessment, were invalid. The Connecticut decree found in
favor of the insurance company, and thus the Ibs assessment was adjudged to have been
properly levied.
In finding against the plaintiff/widow and compelling Minnesota to give full faith
and credit to the Connecticut decree, the Supreme Court did not rely on the notice issue(indeed it was not discussed), but rather relied on (1) the fact that Mrs. Ibs was ade-
quately represented in the Connecticut action (after all, 31 representatives from differ-
ent jurisdictions joined to prosecute the plaintiff class action), and (2) the need for equal
application of the fund to members wherever they are located.
97. This Article is limited to the federal cases. However, the federal cases are rele-
vant to understanding the direction that state cases may take. Most states follow the
federal lead in the class action area. See supra note 9.
98. See infra notes 103-153 and accompanying text.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if(l) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
1985]
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ther, rule 23(c)(2) directs the court to provide pendency notice to
members of a class action maintained pursuant to rule 23(b)(3) so
that an individual member may opt out of the class if he/she
wishes.10' Rule 23(d)(2) permits the court, in its discretion, to pro-
vide pendency and/or post judgment notice to any class or part
thereof if the interests of justice will thereby be served.102
Six years before Eisen IV was decided by the Supreme Court, the
Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline (Eisen 11)103 stated
that Mullane's notice requirement was applicable to all class ac-
tions. Eisen attempted to have the action classified under subsec-
tion (b)(1) or (b)(2) of rule 23. He was induced by what the Second
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and na-
ture of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall di-
rect to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if
he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) provides:
Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring, for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or*
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or de-
fenses, or otherwise to come into the action ...
103. 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Eisen 11]. Eisen went up
and down the federal court system, scouting unkown procedural terrain, only to meet
an unhappy end. Eisen's first attempt at certification failed and the district court dis-
missed the class allegations. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) [hereinafter cited as Eisen 1]. In Eisen I, he appealed to the Second Circuit and
the defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit to hear the appeal. The
defendants lost. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) cert denied,
386 U.S. 1035 (1967). In Eisen II, the Second Circuit reversed the district court on the
certification issue. On remand, the district court certified the class, ordered a certain
type of notice, and allocated a portion of the notice costs to defendants. Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The defendants appealed these or-
ders to the Second Circuit. In Eisen III, the Second Circuit reversed the district court
and dismissed the case. Eisen II, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). Eisen appealed the
Second Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court. In Eisen IV the Supreme Court va-
cated Eisen III and, after hearing, dismissed the case because the plaintiff would not pay
the cost of pendency notice to ascertainable class members.
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Circuit referred to as "his erroneous theory that notice is not
'mandatory' under [those] sections." 1 4 Putting Eisen straight and
relying on Mullane, the court stated:
This theory is based on the assumption that 23(c)(2) provides the
only "mandatory" notice required by the new rule. Since this
particular section refers exclusively to actions brought under
23(b)(3), other suits cognizable under either 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2)
would only be subject to "discretionary" notice under 23(d)(2).
Nevertheless, we hold that notice is required as a matter of due
process in all representative actions, and 23(c)(2) merely requires
a particularized form of notice in 23(b)(3) actions.105
104. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 564.
105. Id. at 564-65 (citations and footnotes omitted). The court, in addition to citing
and relying upon the Mullane case, also cited and thereby relied on portions of the
ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. 95 at 106-07. The court's reliance on Mullane is under-
standable (see supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text), but its citation to the ACN is
not. The portion of the ACN cited states:
Indeed, under subdivision (c)(2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely
discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b)(3) class action an op-
portunity to secure exclusion from the class. This mandatory notice pursuant
to subdivision (c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the court
may find it advisable to give under subdivision (d)(2), is designed to fulfill
requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is of course
subject. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); cf. Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d
973, 979 (2d Cir. 1952), and studies cited at 979 n.4; see also All American
Airways, Inc v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1954); Gart v. Cole, 263
F.2d 244, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
ACN, supra at 106-07.
The language of the ACN clearly states that notice to the (b)(3) class is mandatory
pursuant to (c)(2) and discretionary otherwise. Further, the cases cited in the ACN,
excluding Hansberry and Mullane, merely require that notice be provided the class after
a judgment regarding liability is obtained so that each class member can choose to claim
his/her damages and thereby be bound by the judgment. For a further discussion of the
meaning of these cases, see infra note 270.
It should be emphasized that the court in Eisen 11 did understand the dual function of
the class device. The court explained: "By establishing a technique whereby the claims
of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the
possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of ob-
taining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual
litigation." Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 560.
The court was particularly aware of the small claimants' plight, recognizing "the
desirability of providing small claimants with a forum in which to seek redress for al-
leged large scale anti-trust violations. . . ." Id. at 567. Indeed, the court was quite
aware that the cost of pendency notice could effectively deprive small claimants of a
remedy. Thus, despite the clear language of rule 23(c)(2) commanding individual notice
to identify able class members, the court said:
[P]ublished notice may amount to the "best notice practicable," particularly
where requirement of a different form of notice would, in effect, prevent po-
tentially meritorious claims from being litigated. In this connection we must
note that in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70
S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the party required to furnish individual notice
was a large banking institution and not a small individual claimant. Similarly,
in other cases publication has been rejected as insufficient notice where it was
sought to be used by the City of New York, Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), the New Haven Railroad,
1985]
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The court held that Eisen's class action was a (b)(3) action,10 6
thereby relegating its broad constitutional pronouncements on
(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions to nothing more than dicta. Nonethe-
less, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits followed the reasoning of Eisen
I1 in a series of cases involving the resjudicata effect of the district
court decision in Gregory v. Hershey.10 7 In that case plaintiff Greg-
ory, for himself and all others similarly situated, brought suit
against the defendant, the Selective Service, requesting the district
court to issue an injunction requiring the defendant to grant the
class fatherhood deferments. The district court found the action
was a (b)(1) and (b)(2) action and entered judgment in favor of the
class. Notice was not ordered, since "[n]otification of members of
the class is impractical because of the number of members and the
absence of any reasonable way of identifying them$. 108
In an attempt to stop induction into military service, several
members of the class initiated actions in other jurisdictions to ob-
tain the benefits of the Gregory decision.10 9 Refusing to review the
propriety of the original finding that Gregory was an appropriate
City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 293,
73 S.Ct. 299, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953) and the City of Huchinson, Kansas, Walker
v. City of Huchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178 (1956).
Id. at 569-70.
The court attempted to relieve plaintiff from the heavy cost of notice by distinguish-
ing Mullane from the small claimant plaintiff class suit in two ways: One, the fact that
in considering what the "best notice practicable" is, a court should realize that unlike
Mullane, no trust fund is available to the small claimant and, two, that Mullane's notice
requirement has been vigorously applied when the suit is a traditional suit between
private parties. Nonetheless, the court did state that some type of notice was required
by the due process clause.
106. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 565.
107. 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Gregory v.
Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). The judgment
and order of the district court is found at 51 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
108. Gregory v. Hershey, 51 F.R.D. at 189.
109. Although the Gregory court ordered the National Director of the Selective Ser-
vice System to re-classify any registrant that was a member of the Gregory class, the
National Director did not do so. Suits were, therefore, brought by Gregory class mem-
bers attempting to enforce the Gregory decision. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470
F.2d 73, 75 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972). Indeed, after Greg-
ory was reversed, registrants who were members of the Gregory class sought, nonethe-
less, to have the Gregory decision enforced on the ground that the National Director
had acted lawlessly by not abiding by the Gregory decision. Id. at 77 (Eschbach, J.,
dissenting).
It is odd that the National Director never questioned the jurisdiction of the Gregory
district court to issue an order extending beyond the border of its district. The validity
of that order was questioned by the court in Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.
1971) (which reversed the district court decision), wherein the court stated:
Defendants have not . . . questioned the jurisdiction of the court over the
State Directors of Selective Service, the Local Boards and their members for
the states of Indiana, Illinois and Minnesota.
Allowing class actions to be brought by Selective Service registrants to en-
join not only their own induction, but the induction of others similarly situ-
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(b)(2) class action, the district court in Whitmore v. Tarr11° applied
res judicata because "[true] class suits . . . 'bind all of the class
properly represented.'"111 In Germonprez v. Director of Selective
ated throughout the nation, can have a far-reaching and disruptive effect on
the operation of the Selective Service System.
Query: Suppose that the District Court in the present case had ruled that
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated were not entitled to [deferments].
Would such a decision be binding on a registrant from another state... ?
Id. at 514 n.2.
In Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938), the Supreme Court clearly stated
that the court had no personal jurisdiction over class members except to the extent of
the res brought before the court. Following this view, although without citing Christo-
pher, the court in Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir. 1975), limited the
effect of a class judgment concerning prisoners' rights to the federal prison situated
within the district court's district, stating:
The District Court could properly conclude that in this case a representative
action was appropriate, but not, we believe, with respect to prisoners outside
the Southern District of Indiana. By so limiting the representative proceed-
ing, we avoid the possibility that respondents, the members of the Board of
Parole, whose responsibilities extend throughout the United States, will be
subjected, even temporarily, to inconsistent judgments by courts of coordinate
jurisdiction, and we give the other courts of appeals the respect and comity
which are their due.
Moreover, a true representative action cuts both ways. Allowing wider rep-
resentation. .. might very well result in injustice to absent prisoners within
the represented class, who, if entitled to the benefits of the action, would also
be... bound, by an adverse determination. We think it best that. .. the
representation be limited to other prisoners within the district.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The government, as we will see, takes varying positions on this issue depending on the
facts of the case. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
110. 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D.Neb. 1970), vacated, 443 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). The district court did state without explanation that
"[tihis court, then, cannot and will not look behind those findings," thereby rendering
such findings immune from collateral attack. 318 F. Supp. 1281. Clearly, the district
court's view is wrong. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324, 325-26 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (wherein the court said,
"Although there may be no right to opt out in a (b)(2) action, the judgment is always
subject to attack on the premise that those absent members were inadequately repre-
sented and thus are not bound. For this reason it is essential that representation of
absent class members be adequate from the start."); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67
(5th Cir. 1973) (class action may be collaterally attacked on adequacy grounds, see infra
notes 246-253 and accompanying text).
111. Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. at 1285 (quoting Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), as authority for its position). Professor Moore explained
that Ben-Hur was binding on absent class members because, under the old rule 23
jargon, it was a true class suit. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937). Commen-
tators have questioned and criticized this categorization of the Ben-Hur case. Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 1, at 255-56. At any rate, present rule 23 does not employ the same
language or categories as old rule 23 so that the court's explanation was woefully inade-
quate. Compare (Old rule 23) FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939) with (New rule
23) FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see generally ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. 95, at 98-99.
Consistent with the Whitmore court's deferential, indeed almost supplicant attitude
toward decisions of other federal judges, the court, after reviewing the cases, expressed
its belief that Judge Smith, in Gregory, did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant
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Service,'12 the district court, in reliance on Gregory, granted plain-
tiff's request for a preliminary injunction forbidding the Selective
Service to "requir[e] plaintiff to report for induction into the mili-
tary service .... 1113 In reviewing Gregory, the court found that
"[t]he plaintiff herein is a member of the class determined in the
Gregory case, but is not a named party therein, nor was he notified
of the Gregory action prior to the judgement therein."' 14 Without
further discussion, the court concluded that since Gregory was
favorable to the class, "plaintiff has established a substantial likeli-
hood that he will prevail on the merits" and entered a preliminary
injunction in plaintiff's favor.115
The notice issue achieved recognition rather than honorable men-
tion in Schrader v. Selective Service System. 116 The defendant in
Schrader, as in the other cases, conceded the plaintiff was "a mem-
ber of the Gregory class but contend[ed] that the Gregory judgment
[did] not have binding effect. . . because notice was not given to
the. . . class."'1 17 The defendant attempted to assert the mutuality
of estoppel principle, 18 claiming that it was unfair to permit plain-
tiff to bind defendant when the due process clause would not permit
the defendant to enforce an adverse Gregory judgment upon plain-
tiff and other class members who had not received notice.1 19 The
court avoided the notice issue by choosing to abandon the mutuality
principle, 120 explaining that whether or not plaintiff and the plain-
pre-induction relief but, nonetheless, felt bound by Judge Smith's determination. Whit-
more, 318 F. Supp. at 1285.
112. 318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970).
113. Id. at 830.
114. Id.
115. Id. The district court appears to have used the Gregory decision merely as
evidence that plaintiff will likely "prevail on the merits" enabling it to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction. The court must have believed that lack of notice prevented the applica-
tion of res judicata, because it did not issue a permanent injunction. It thus left the
merit issue open (rather than barred) for determination at the trial for a permanent
injunction.
116. 329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
117. Id. at 967.
118. Simply stated, the mutuality of estoppel principle only permits a party to use
resjudicata and/or collateral estoppel if the opposing party could do the same, i.e., both
proponent and opponent must be bound by resjudicata and/or collateral estoppel. See
generally Currie, supra note 82, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 and 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25. For a
good description of how the principle works, see Ralph Wolff & Sons v. New Zealand
Ins. Co., 248 Ky. 304, 58 S.W.2d 623 (1933), and for an explanation of the reasons for
its abandonment see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Bernhard v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
119. The defendant also advanced an argument similar to that raised in Eisen II,
that even though rule 23 did not require the members of the (b)(1) or (b)(2) class to
receive pendency notice, the due process clause did. Shrader, 329 F. Supp. at 967.
120. When mutuality is abandoned, a stranger, one not bound by a prior suit, may
nonetheless use collateral estoppel to bind a party who, in the prior suit, had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. See supra note 118.
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tiff class are bound is irrelevant to whether or not defendant had the
opportunity to fully litigate the issues in the previous case.121 The
court found that the defendant fully litigated the issues in the previ-
ous case and therefore bound the defendant to the result of the
Gregory decision.' 22
Defendants were the winners in two other district court cases,
McCarthy v. Director of Selective Service System 123 and Pasquier v.
Tarr.124 Pasquier, upon which McCarthy relied, quite clearly stated
that "it is the holding of this Court that notice was not given to the
members of the Gregory class and that such failure to notify consti-
tutes a violation of due process." 125 The Pasquier court rejected
authorities which held that adequacy of representation rather than
pendency notice is the key to a binding class judgment and instead
121. The court said:
A judgment in favor of the defendant against the class may not be binding
upon members of the class who later sue the defendant and argue that they
were not adequately represented in the class action. But the rationale for this
view is that every man must be guaranteed his day in court. This rationale has
no application to the converse situation in which defendants have had the
opportunity fully to litigate the issues in a previous case. The very purpose of
Rule 23 was to reduce multiple litigation of the same issues. I see no good
reason why the government should be permitted continual relitigation of an
issue already judicially determined.
Shrader, 329 F. Supp. at 467 (footnote omitted).
Perhaps the court was purposefully glib. By not mentioning the word "notice" and
by not citing any authority which might explain its reasoning, it is possible to uphold
the court's position regardless of whether or not pendency notice is constitutionally
required in order to bind members of a class to a prior judgment. The passage is hospi-
table to either view. So long as a person had his/her day in court, that person should be
bound by the result. Whether or not the class is bound, because it was or was not
adequately represented, is irrelevant. The implication is that a class judgment can be
attacked for inadequate representation, i.e., no day in court, rather than for merely not
receiving notice. On the other hand, it is at least equally convincing to argue that a
class is inadequately represented when it does not receive pendency notice. This latter
position is the stronger since the court's statement was made in response to defendant's
contention regarding notice.
122. Id. If the class was inadequately represented (either because the representation
was itself inadequate or because the representatives failed to provide pendency notice to
class members), then, according to the court, the class could not be bound, but the class
could bind defendant who had its day in court. If pendency notice was a requirement,
then the shrewd class representative would not provide pendency notice to the class,
and go on to litigate the merits. If the representative was successful, the class, accord-
ing to the court, could take advantage of the representative's win. If the representative
lost, then the defendant, according to the court, could not take advantage of the loss
because the class was inadequately represented. Hence, each time a representative lost,
another could take up the banner, until one won so that the class could then use the
victory of the winning member for the benefit of the entire class. This no win situation
for the defendant was a major reason that old rule 23 was amended. ACN, supra note
79, 39 F.R.D. 95, at 105-06.
123. 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
125. Id. at 1352.
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embraced the reasoning of Eisen 11.126 The court noted that the
plaintiff was not objecting to the fact that he and other class mem-
bers had not received notice. However, adhering to the mutuality
principle,127 the court stated that:
[T]he matter should be viewed from both sides, not just from the
point of view of the plaintiff... For if a court rules on the
merits in favor of the class, the absent members can reap the
benefits of such a decision. But if the court should rule against
the class on the merits, then, as we have hitherto noted, they [sic]
can argue that they [sic] were not adequately represented. This
leaves a defendant to a Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class action in a
most precarious position, and we simply cannot subscribe to a
rule of law with such unfair consequences. 128
The court appears to presume that the receipt of pendency notice
satisfied any possible objection the class member may have had con-
cerning class representation and, therefore, provides for the entry of
a valid binding class judgment for or against the class. For the Pas-
quier court, once pendency notice is provided, a class member can
no longer collaterally attack the class judgment on inadequacy
grounds because, presumably, the member could do so by direct
attack in the case itself.129
None of the cases which discussed the notice issue, Eisen II,
Schrader, and Pasquier, attempted to explain how or why pendency
notice performs its magic. 130 The reason must be that pendency
notice provides class members with a means of assenting to repre-
sentation, by doing nothing after receipt of such notice, or objecting
to the representation in the proceeding itself. The Pasquier court
did not want to sanction a rule which would permit a class member
to take advantage of a class win, but challenge a class loss. Hence,
pendency notice provided a means of compelling the class member
to choose to be bound or object before the member knows who the
winner is. It sounds fair enough, but this reasoning collapses when
it is examined in practice rather than in theory. Let us suppose that
126. Id. at 1353.
127. Although applying the mutuality principle, the court did not mention it by
name.
128. Id. at 1353-54.
129. One could read Hansberry, which sustained a collateral attack on a class judg-
ment where the class did not receive notice, as authority for the Pasquier court's view.
See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 43, at 338-39, where the authors argue that the
Hansberry court held, albeit imperfectly stated, that pendency notice is required by the
due process clause before a binding class judgment may be entered.
130. The difference in the ultimate result between Schrader and Pasquier (and Mc-
Carthy) lies primarily with the mutuality doctrine. Pasquier (and McCarthy) did not
apply resjudicata/collateral estoppel and, therefore, went on to the merits, holding that
the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant pre-induction relief; de-
fendant won. Shrader, concealing its view of the notice issue, did not apply the mutual-
ity doctrine and, therefore, estopped the defendant; plaintiff won.
[Vol. 22
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Mr. Pasquier, while living in New Orleans, Louisiana, 131 received
notice of the Gregory action, which included an explanation of the
nature of the proceeding, the name of the class representative and
his attorneys, the court and cause, and the fact that it was being
prosecuted in Detroit, Michigan. 132 The question remains, what is
Mr. Pasquier expected to do? Rule 23 does not permit a (b)(1) or
(b)(2) class member as in Gregory to opt out.133 Pasquier and other
class members would have to travel to Detroit and somehow inves-
tigate and monitor the proceedings, the parties, or the attorneys so
as to ascertain whether each was being adequately represented. As-
suming, somehow, Pasquier and others manage to do all that, what
happens if they become dissatisfied with the representation? Each
must hire counsel so as to properly object.134 If they object and
win, they have lost a great deal of time, energy, and money and
have merely maintained the status quo.135 If they object and lose,
they must continue to use their time, energy and money to seek
review of the court's determination regarding their objection. 136
131. Pasquier brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana. Pasquier, 318 F. Supp. 1350.
132. Pendency notice in a class action (b)(2) suit must include the identity of the
class representative, the court in which the action is pending, the name and address of
the attorney(s) representing the class, the name of the defendant(s) against whom the
action is filed, and a broad description of the type of claims and responses which have
been alleged. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 2475c (1977).
133. The federal circuit courts of appeal do not allow a class member to opt out of a
(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) class. 3B J. MooRE, supra note 3, at 23.31(3) (1984); 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 1787 (1972); 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at
§ 2560a (1977). As will be discussed, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits appear to require
notice to (b)(2) class members who are alleged to be entitled to monetary relief. John-
son v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979); Holmes v. Continental Can
Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (1lth Cir. 1983); see also Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th
Cir. 1979). A close reading of these cases reveals that these courts only require post
judgment notice to class members so as to permit each to opt in or out of the damage
portion of the case rather than permitting (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members to opt out of
the traditional (b)(1) and (b)(2) type action.
Commentators agree that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members should not be permitted to
opt out of the class. Benjamin Kaplan, the federal advisory committee reporter, stated
that rule 23(b)(1) and (2) was the "natural class action,. . . [where] final relief had to
be unitary in order to protect the interests of those deliberately or inevitably affected
((b)(1)) or. . . [where it was] unitary because it extended only to common rights (.
(b)(2))." 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 1, at 107 (1977). See also 3B J. MOoRE, supra
note 3, at 23-440-41 (1984). For a full discussion of this issue, see infra notes 192-200,
236 and accompanying text.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) permits only members of a (b)(3) class to "enter an
appearance through counsel." Presumably, counsel would also be required if interven-
tion was permitted in a (b)(1) and (b)(2) class suit. See generally Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982).
135. Actually, they must remain vigilant. The named representative may appeal the
adequacy issue and prevail, resulting in a remand and a possible certification of the
class. It is to be recalled that Eisen lost the certification of his class-on adequacy
grounds--only to win reversal, remand and certification three years later. See supra
note 23.
136. The appealability or reviewability of the denial and/or grant of a class certifica-
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These courts have refused to examine the consequences of their
own rule. By simply stating the incantation: notice satisfies due
process, reality is easily ignored. The truth is that most members of
small claimant classes who receive pendency notice will simply not
understand its provisions. 137 Certainly, such persons cannot afford
to do anything to monitor the pending action, even if it were filed
nearby, let alone hire counsel to investigate, intervene, object and
appeal. Notice, therefore, satisfies nothing, except perhaps the con-
science of the court. Even this is not deserved. For, while ostensi-
bly eager to be fair to both plaintiff class and defendants, noble
sounding slogans that require pendency notice and its consequent
costs deprive small claimant class members of their only remedy-
the class action.138
The consequences of a pendency notice requirement were not dis-
cussed by the circuit courts when Gregory and some of its progeny
were appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed Gregory in Gregory v.
Tarr139 on the ground that Gregory lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion (pre-induction relief was outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts). 14 Thereafter, in short per curiam opinions, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed Pasquier14' and the Seventh Circuit affirmed McCar-
tion order (which includes the adequacy finding of rule 23(a)(4)) is still subject to dis-
pute. Generally, class rulings are considered interlocutory and are therefore
unappealable, although a few exceptions have developed. Neither the so-called "death
knell" doctrine, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), nor 28 U.S.C.
1292(a)(1), nor Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978), may
be invoked in support of appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying class certifica-
tion. An order denying class certification has been successfully appealed using FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) when the district court certifies the order denying certification and dis-
misses the complaint as to the absent class members. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at
§§ 2175 and 2184.
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether immediate review of an order
granting certification is permissible. The Second Circuit, citing the enormous costs im-
posed upon a defendant in a class suit, has articulated a three-prong test for reviewabil-
ity of a class certification order. In Herbst v. I.T.T. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d
Cir. 1974) the court formulated the following guidelines: 1) class determination must be
fundamental to the further conduct of the case; 2) the order must be separable from the
merits; and 3) the order will cause irreparable harm to the defendant in terms of time
and money spent in defending the class action. Reception of the Second Circuit's three-
prong test has been mixed. See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 3, at 23.97 (1984).
137. Most people who receive class notice do not understand its contents. T.
BARTSH, F. BODDY, B. KING & P. THOMPSON, A CLASS AcTION Surr THAT
WORKED, 106-12 (1978); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62
GEO. L.J. 1123, 1149 (1974); Miller, Problems in Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 313, 321-22 (1973); see generally Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp.
945, 959 (W.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975).
138. Note, supra note 137, at 1161.
139. 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
140. Id. Indeed, the defendants never even "questioned the validity of the [Gregory]
class action although no notice to the members of the class was given. Id. at 514
n.2.
141. 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
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thy, 142 both on reliance in Gregory v. Tarr, holding there was no
subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Seventh Circuit, in re-
versing Schrader,143 specifically relied on Eisen II stating: "The
Michigan District Court in Gregory erred in not requiring notice to
be given in some manner to absent class members, and the Wiscon-
sin District Court erred applying the principle of resjudicata to the
Gregory ruling. ' '
14 4
After this decision, the Sixth Circuit in Zeilstra v. Tarr145 was
called upon to decide what effect, if any, Gregory had on cases
which were pending before Gregory v. Tarr was decided. The court
first held that the Gregory order "was not a valid order because the
Court was without jurisdiction to enter it, and the order was a nul-
lity.1 46 Apparently, insecure in this holding, the Zeilstra court, in
reliance on the Seventh Circuit's position in Schrader and the Sec-
ond Circuit's view as expressed in Eisen II, went on to "hold that
Gregory was not a valid class action since no notice was ever given
to the members of the class." 147
The result of this series of cases is that both the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits embraced Eisen II's reasoning without any analysis or in-
142. 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972).
143. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972).
144. Id. at 75. After concluding that the National Director was not bound by the
Gregory decision, the court disposed of plaintiff's individual claim by holding that the
federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant pre-induction relief. One judge
dissented on the ground that the National Director acted lawlessly by disobeying the
Gregory order prior to Gregory being reversed. See supra note 109.
145. 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
146. Id. at 113. The court found that Gregory's mandatory order was invalid be-
cause the Gregory court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It, therefore, reversed.
Great debate has ensued since the United Mine Workers Union and its leader, John L.
Lewis, were fined $3,500,000 and $10,000 respectively. During World War II, members
of the Union, led by Lewis, struck the coal mines, although the mines had been taken
over by the United States to ensure their continued production during the time of na-
tional emergency. Despite provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act which prohibit fed-
eral courts from issuing restraining orders in cases growing out of labor disputes, the
district court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the threatened strike
pending its determination concerning the union's right under the collective bargaining
agreement. Lewis and the union were held in contempt and fined. United States v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947). In upholding the contempt rulings
(although modifying the union's fine), the Court stated: "[Tihe District Court unques-
tionably had the power to issue a restraining order for the purpose of preserving existing
conditions pending a decision upon its own jurisdiction." Id. at 290. "Orders outstand-
ing. .. [are] to be obeyed until they expire or [are] set aside by appropriate proceed-
ings, appellate or otherwise." Id. at 294. See also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307 (1967).
The difference between the Gregory order and the Mine Workers order is twofold: (1)
the Mine Workers court had subject matter jurisdiction, while the Gregory court did
not, and (2) the Mine Workers court issued a passive order seeking to preserve the status
quo, while the Gregory court issued a mandatory order which, if obeyed, would have
changed the status quo. See also supra note 109; see generally D. DOBBs, REMEDIES 85-
87 (1973).
147. Zeilstra, 466 F.2d at 113.
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quiry into the bedrock upon which that decision was based. Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit's statement concerning notice was merely an after-
thought and thus was quickly rejected by the district courts as
dictum.148
The Second Circuit's gratuitous edict in Eisen Il-notice is re-
quired in all representative actions149is no longer followed by the
Sixth 50 and Seventh Circuits151 and has been abandoned by the
Second Circuit itself.152 Moreover, the Supreme Court in a number
of cases beginning with its decision in Eisen IV has clearly, albeit
implicitly, held that pendency notice is not constitutionally required
in all class suits.' 53
2. A History of Less Confusion: The Supreme Court Decides
That Pendency Notice is Not Required in the (b)(1) and (b)(2) Class
Actions.-After remand in Eisen II, the district court certified the
action as a (b)(3) class action. In lieu of mailed notice to the
2,225,000 ascertainable class members, the court ordered a scheme
of notification consisting of individual mailed notice to a few thou-
sand class members combined with publication.1 54 The district
148. See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975); Branham v. General Electric Co.,
63 F.R.D. 667 (N.D. Tenn. 1974).
149. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. Even before the Second Circuit
discarded the Eisen II dicta, the more enlightened view was persuasively expressed in
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D. Conn. 1973), wherein the
three-judge court said: "Although it is suggested that dictum in [Eisen I1] requires
notice in all class actions,. . . we read [Eisen I1] simply to say that notice is required in
all class actions when due process so requires." The court went on to hold that ade-
quate representation rather than pendency notice, sufficiently safeguards the rights of
(b)(1) and (b)(2) class members, so that a valid judgment, binding all members, may be
entered.
153. Even before Eisen IV was decided, the Supreme Court upheld the resjudicata
(binding) effect of class judgments on absent class members who had not received any
type of pendency notice. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917); Hart-
ford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) (see supra note 49); Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (see supra note 43); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S.
288 (1853) (dictum).
154. Actually, the district court ordered a four-part notification scheme; (1) individ-
ual notice to all members of the New York Stock Exchange (the market in which the
defendants traded stocks) and to commercial banks with large trust departments; (2)
individual notice to some 2,000 class members with ten or more odd lot transactions
during the relevant period; (3) individual notice to an additional 5,000 class members
randomly selected; and (4) prominent publication notice in the Wall Street Journal and
other newspapers in New York and California. The total cost, at the time of the district
court's order, was $21,720. The district court, after a hearing, shifted "90% of the cost
of notice, or $19,548" to the defendants. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 167-68.
The district court seems to have acted upon Judge Medina's hints in Eisen II: "the
desirability of providing small claimants with a forum" compels a practical approach to
the pendency notice problem. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 567; see also supra note 105. If so
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 22 [1985], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss1/3
THE CLASS ACTION
court, after conducting a hearing on the merits, shifted ninety per-
cent of the notice cost to defendant. 155 The defendant appealed; the
Second Circuit reversed and dismissed.15 6 Eisen petitioned the
Supreme Court for review.
The Supreme Court in Eisen IV found "the District Court's reso-
lution of the notice problems was erroneous... [because] it failed
to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2), and...
[because] it imposed part of the cost of notice on respondents." 1 57
The Court quoted and emphasized the pertinent portion of rule
23(c)(2) which requires individual notice to be provided to all class
members who can be identified through reasonable effort and
claimed that the "import of this language is unmistakable."1 58
Nonetheless, Eisen argued that individual notice should not be re-
quired because (1) its expense would frustrate vindication of anti-
trust policy, and (2) it is unnecessary because no class member will
opt out since each member's claim is small and the cost of litigation
is high. The Court supplied a short answer (one suspects because a
sound, reasoned response was unavailable):
The short answer to these arguments is that individual notice to
identifiable class members is not... to be waived .... It is,
rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23 .... There is
nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be
tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs.159
Last, and perhaps most importantly for us, Eisen tried to per-
suade the Court to dispense with notice because "adequate repre-
sentation, rather than notice, is the touchstone of due process...
and therefore satisfies Rule 23."160 Again, the Court's response was
short:
We think this view has little to commend it. To begin with, Rule
23 speaks to notice as well as to adequacy of representation and
requires that both be provided. Moreover, petitioner's argument
proves too much, for it quickly leads to the conclusion that no
notice at all, published or otherwise, would be required in the
present case. This cannot be so, for quite apart from what due
process may require, the command of Rule 23 is clearly to the
the district court clearly misconceived Judge Medina's remarks in Eisen II, because in
Eisen III, 479 F.2d 1005, Judge Medina reversed the district court and dismissed the
class action, stating "our prior opinion [in Eisen I1]. . .stated unequivocally that ac-
tual notice must be given to those whose identity could be ascertained with reasonable
effort and that 'in his type case' of course plaintiff must pay the expense of giving
notice to these members of the class." Id. at 1009.
155. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 167-68. See supra note 154.
156. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1020; see also supra note 154.
157. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 172-73.
158. Id. at 173.
159. Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
160. Id.
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contrary. We therefore conclude that Rule 23(c)(2) requires that
individual notice be sent to all class members who can be identi-
fied with reasonable effort. 161
Clearly, the Court relied on the rule and not the Constitution to
reach its result. It was not called upon to interpret, nor should it
have interpreted, the Constitution, because a statutory interpreta-
tion resolved the issue.162 But the Court's phrase, "for quite apart
from what due process may require,"'163 can mean: (1) without the
rule, due process would require the same result at least in a rule 23
(b)(3) action; (2) without the rule, due process is satisfied with less
than individual notice, such as publication; (3) without the rule, due
process is satisfied by adequate representation; or, (4) due process is
irrelevant since the rule speaks clearly to the issue. Some assistance
is provided when the Court explained that it was "concerned...
only with the notice requirements of. . . (6)(2), which are applica-
ble to class actions maintained under . . .(b)(3)," and indicated
that (c)(2) is inapplicable to (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. 64 As
indicated earlier, the Court dismissed the suit because Eisen would
not pay the $315,000 pendency notice cost.' 65
In terms of providing guidance to the lower courts and litigants,
Eisen IV clearly held that rule 23 required individual pendency no-
tice to ascertainable members of a (b)(3) class. The Court implied
that the same analysis would not be followed for the (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions although whether or not some type of pendency
161. Id. at 176-77.
162. There must be a strict necessity for disposing of an issue on constitutional
grounds. Chief Justice Marshall's rationale for judicial review was that it be absolutely
essential for the Court to decide cases in conformity with the Constitution before doing
so. Hence, while he was the architect of judicial review, he demanded judicial restraint.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Doctrines related to advisory opin-
ions, moatness, collusiveness, ripeness, prematurity, abstractness, standing, and other
rules of judicial restraint, are generally functions of the basic judicial duty to avoid
discussion of constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549 (1947); see generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980).
One commentator has, nonetheless, suggested that Eisen IV did not necessarily rest
on rule 23 alone. "A close reading of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion [in Eisen IF] sug-
gests that he did not want to base the notice holding on the Constitution. Yet, his plain
meaning methodology in interpreting the Rule apparently does not satisfy even him.
He returns time and again to due process considerations to give plausibility to his liter-
alist interpretation of the Rule." Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup.
CT. REv. 97, 110 (1975). It is submitted that whether the rule or the Constitution is the
basis of the Court's decision (although clearly it is the former), the pendency notice
requirement remains an implausible, unjustifiable impediment to the redress of legally
protected rights.
163. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 177 n.14.
165. Id. at 179; see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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notice was constitutionally required in those class actions i la Eisen
II, was left open. However, eight months later in Sosna v. Iowa,166
the Supreme Court put that issue to bed by holding that pendency
notice is not constitutionally required in order to bind class mem-
bers to a (b)(1) and (b)(2) class judgment.
Mrs. Sosna moved to Iowa and, after one month residency, peti-
tioned the Iowa court for a dissolution of marriage. The Iowa court
dismissed the case because Mrs. Sosna did not comply with Iowa's
one-year residency statute. Mrs. Sosna then filed a class action in
the district court for the Northern District of Iowa asserting that
the Iowa residency statute was unconstitutional and requesting that
an injunction against its enforcement be issued.167 The three-judge
court found that the class action complied with the prerequisites
enumerated in rule 23(a) 68 and held Iowa's residency statute con-
stitutional.1 69 The case was then brought to the Supreme Court.
As to the type of class action certified and whether notice was re-
quired, the Court said:
Although the complaint did not so specify, the absence of a claim
for monetary relief and the nature of the claim asserted disclose
... a Rule 23(b)(2) class action .... Therefore, the problems
associated with a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, which were consid-
ered. . . in [Eisen IJ], are not present in this case. 170
Holding the action was not a (b)(3) class action and that there-
fore pendency notice was not required, was essential for the Court's
decision. Without so holding, the Court could not proceed, as it
did, to a decision on the merits. As it turns out, by the time the case
reached the Court, Mrs. Sosna had not only fulfilled the require-
ment of Iowa's residency statute, but had also obtained a divorce. 171
As the Court explained, the case, nonetheless, was not moot:
If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both the fact that
she now satisfies the one-year residency requirement and the fact
that she has obtained a divorce. . . would make this case moot
and require dismissal. But appellant brought this suit as a class
action and sought to litigate the constitutionality of the. . . resi-
dency requirement in a representative capacity. When the Dis-
trict Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of
unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal
status separate from the interest asserted by appellant.' 72
166. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
167. Id. at 395.
168. Id. at 397-98.
169. Id. at 396.
170. Id. at 397 n.4.
171. Id. at 398.
172. Id. at 399 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court elaborated:
The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the
unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds to judgment on the mer-
1985]
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Hence, it was the absent class members who kept the case alive or
justiciable because each was still subject to the requirements of
Iowa's residency statute.173 Underscoring the view that adequate
representation rather than pendency notice is the key to the entry of
a valid, binding class judgment, the Court said: "Since it is contem-
plated that all members of the class will be bound by the ultimate
ruling on the merits, Rule 23(c)(3), the district court must assure
itself that the named representative will adequately protect the in-
terests of the class." 174
The court upheld the certification of the rule 23(b)(2) class, sanc-
tioned the lack of pendency notice to class members, and went on to
rule against the entire class on the merits.175
Following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Eisen IV and
Sosna (and similar cases), 176 the circuit courts have uniformly held
its, it is contemplated that the decision will bind all. . . members of the class.
Rule 23(c)(3); Advisory Committee Note, 28 U.S.C. App. pp. 7765-66. Once
the suit is certified as a class action, it may not be settled or dismissed without
the approval of the court. Rule 23(e).
Id. at 399 n.8.
173. Id. at 401.
174. Id. at 403. The Court used a Hansberry analysis to find that there was a "ho-
mogeneity of interests" amongst the class members. Indeed, the court found it "diffi-
cult to imagine why any person in the class. . . would have an interest in seeing [Iowa's
residency statute] upheld." Id. at 403 n.13. The Court, therefore, concluded:
In the present suit, where it is unlikely that segments of the class appellant
represents would have interests conflicting with those she has sought to ad-
vance, and where the interests of the class have been competently urged at
each level of the proceeding, we believe that the test of Rule 23(a) is met. We
therefore address ourselves to the merits of appellant's constitutional claim.
Id. at 403 [footnote omitted].
175. Id. at 396, 400.
176. Although there is no Supreme Court decision directly on point, the Court has
refused to overturn, on due process grounds, a (b)(1) or (b)(2) type suit where no pen-
dency notice was ordered by the lower court. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979);
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
In Zablocki, a (b)(2) class suit was brought on behalf of divorced fathers alleging that
a Wisconsin statute denied them their fundamental right to remarry because they were
delinquent in their child support payments. 434 U.S. at 374. Pendency notice was not
at issue in the opinion. However, Justice Marshall's plurality opinion mentioned, with-
out discussion, the district court's ruling that "neither Rule 23 nor due process required
prejudgment notice to members of the plaintiff or the defendant class." Id. at 379-80.
No other justices either supported or criticized the district court's ruling.
In Quern, plaintiffs instituted a (b)(2) action for denial of past welfare benefits. 440
U.S. at 332. The lower court decision was appealed post-judgment on eleventh amend-
ment grounds. Justice Rehnquist stated: "Because this was a class action qualifying
under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2), the class members had never received notice of the
complaint. . . . Under Rule 23(d)(2), however, a court may require appropriate notice
'for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action.'" Id. at 335 n.3.
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty presented the Court with an issue similar
to that presented in Sosna; whether the mooting of the representative's claim after de-
nial of certification also causes the (b)(2) class's claims to expire. 445 U.S. at 388. In
[Vol. 22
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that pendency notice is not constitutionally required in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions. 177 The Second Circuit itself abandoned Eisen
II's dictum. Citing Sosna, Judge Friendly said, "And we do not
regard the statement with respect to notice in [Eisen II], as apply-
ing to class actions under. . . (b)(2) .... -178 The Sixth Circuit
has discarded its offhand citation to Eisen II without even acknowl-
edging its error. 179 The Seventh Circuit has retracted its reliance on
Eisen 11 in Bgeol v. Benson,180 where it affirmed a habeas corpus
class action brought by prisoners,1 81 holding that "due process did
not require notice" and suggesting that the Schrader decision in
light of Eisen IV "will have to be reexamined."1 8 2
his dissent from the holding that the class suit was still alive, Justice Powell stressed
that class certification is necessary to "a judicial finding that injured parties other than
the named plaintiff exist." Id. at 415 n.8. "After certification, class members can be
certain that the action will not be settled or dismissed without appropriate notice." Id.
Nowhere did he mention that pendency notice was required.
The commentators are in substantial agreement. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at
207 (1977); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 3, at q 23-440-42 (1984).
177. District of Columbia Circuit: Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974). First
Circuit: Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972). Second Circuit: Ives v. W.T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1975). Third Circuit: Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974); Mat-
tern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975). Fourth Circuit: Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975). Fifth Circuit: Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.
1982); Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolton v.
Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Union Carbide
Corp., 538 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976), opinion on rehearing, 544 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973);
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). Sixth Circuit: Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735,
565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976). Seventh Circuit: Crowder v. Lash, 687
F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1982); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975). Eighth Circuit: Marshall v. Kirkland, 602
F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1979). Ninth Circuit: Elliot v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1977); Molina v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, slip. op. (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975). Tenth
Circuit: Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975). Eleventh Circuit: Holmes v.
Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983).
178. Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
179. In Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), the district
court did not certify the (b)(2) class until deciding favorably upon the merits; hence,
pendency notice was obviously not provided to the class. The Sixth Circuit upheld the
decision because the prerequisites of rule 23(a) were satisfied and the action was prop-
erly maintained as a (b)(2) class action under Title VII, even though the class also
sought back pay money awards.
180. 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975).
181. Id. at 966-67.
182. Id. at 968 and n.3. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir.
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II. DOES RULE 23's REQUIREMENT THAT A (b)(3) CLASS
RECEIVE PENDENCY NOTICE REFLECT A
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OR MERELY A
STATUTORY DIRECTIVE?
A. Why Pendency Notice in (b)(3) and Not (b)(1)?
The Advisory Committee Notes to rule 23 [hereinafter referred to
as ACN] state, in pertinent part:
In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and
the representation is effective, the need for notice to the class will
tend toward a minimum. These indicators suggest that notice
under subdivision (d)(2) may be particularly useful and advisable
in certain class actions maintained under subdivision (b)(3), for
example, to permit members of the class to object to the repre-
sentation. Indeed, under subdivision (c)(2), notice must be or-
dered, and is not merely discretionary, to give the members in a
subdivision (b)(3) class action an opportunity to secure exclusion
from the class. This mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision
(c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the court
may find it advisable to give under subdivision (d)(2), is designed
to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action
procedure is of course subject. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32(1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) .... 183
It can be argued that the Supreme Court in Eisen IV suggested
that the ACN citation to Mullane was intended to explain the intent
of the (c)(2) notice requirement, rather than expound a due process
notice requirement for that section. Indeed, the due process stan-
dard was expounded by the ACN citation to Hansberry; hence, no-
tice only aids in satisfying the due process standard which is the
adequacy of representation standard.184 However, the circuit
courts of appeal imply that the difference between the (b)(1) and (2)
1975), the Seventh Circuit once again skirted the issue and, again, suggested that its
former holding in Schrader should be "reexamined."
183. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 106-07.
184. The Eisen IV Court discussed and liberally quoted from the ACN. The Court
said: "The Advisory Committee described subdivision (c)(2) as 'not merely discretion-
ary' and added that the 'mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) . .. is
designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is of
course subject. . . .'" Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 173. The Court explained that the ACN
citation to Mullane meant, as Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962)
explained, that published notice is not available where names and addresses are ascer-
tainable. Using Schroeder to explain the ACN citation to Mullane, the Court expli-
cated: "Viewed in this context, the express language and intent of Rule 23(c)(2) leave
no doubt that individual notice must be provided to those class members who are identi-
fiable through reasonable effort." Eisen IV, 417 U.S. at 175. It is, therefore, quite rea-
sonable to view Eisen IVas not merely interpreting the requirements of rule 23, but also
as strongly suggesting that it is only rule 23 that compels pendency notice, and even
then only to (b)(3) class members. But see Dam, supra note 162.
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classes and the (b)(3) class is such that the Constitution requires
pendency notice to the latter, but not to the former.
The District of Columbia Circuit decision in Larionoff v. United
States"185 attempted analysis of the issue. The seven named plaintiffs
in Larionoff were sailors who signed up for a certain training pro-
gram and extended their enlistment period in consideration of re-
ceiving a money bonus. When the Navy refused to provide the
bonus, the seven sailors, for themselves and others similarly situ-
ated, filed suit. The district court certified the class as a (b)(1)
class, 18 6 granted the plaintiff class summary judgment and ordered
payment of the money bonus, approximately $700,000.187 The gov-
ernment appealed, claiming the district court erred in both certify-
ing the class and granting summary judgment.1 88 As to the class
issues, the government argued two points: (1) the district court
erred in certifying the class at the same time it ruled on the merits
(in favor of the class), and (2) "that due process required personal
prejudgment notice to the easily identifiable members of this Rule
23(b)(1) class. .. -189
The court responded to the first point by explaining that if the
action were a (b)(3) class action, reversal would be required because
(b)(3) class members must be provided an opportunity to opt out of
the class. Pendency notice, the means of providing that opportu-
nity, was obviously not provided to class members because the dis-
trict court decided the certification issue and the merits of the
action simultaneously.1 90
Despite some authority to the contrary, 191 it is clear that the
(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions are designed to bind each member of
the class and not permit any member to proceed individually. 192
The definition of the (b)(1)(A) & (B) class action mirrors the defini-
tion of rule 19, the necessary/indispensable party rule, 193 which like
rule 23, was amended in 1966 to provide for a functional rather
185. 533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
186. Id. at 1181.
187. Id. at 1187. The court indicated that "[pilaintiffs' counsel asked the District
Court to award them attorneys' fees in the amount of $175,000, approximately 25% of
their estimate of total class recovery." Id. Simple mathematics provides the total class
recovery figure.
188. Id. at 1172.
189. Id. at 1182.
190. Id. at 1182-83.
191. See supra note 133.
192. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 105-06; see supra note 133 and infra notes
193-201 and accompanying text.
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) & (B) provides:
(b) ...An action may be maintained as a class action if...
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
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than theoretical application.' 94 The purpose of rule 19 is to compel
all persons interested in the controversy to be joined as parties to
the suit so that complete justice can be achieved. The rule is con-
cerned with the adverse affect a judgment will have on absentees
(i.e., distribution of a limited fund) and on parties before the court
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 provides:
(a) ...A person. . . shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest ...
Indeed, the ACN to rule 23(b)(1) recognizes that similar concerns are addressed by rule
23(b)(1) and rule 19. "The consideration stated under clauses (A) & (B) are comparable
to certain of the elements which define the persons whose joinder is desirable as stated
in Rule 19(a), as amended." ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 100. This identity of
definition is no coincidence. The vigorous application of the necessary/indispensable
party rule forced the birth of the class action device. At about the time the class action
device began to emerge as a procedural mechanism, the necessary/indispensable party
rule acquired a strict application so as to oust the court of jurisdiction if such parties
were not joined. Therefore, during the seventeenth century, the courts, with few excep-
tions, required the joinder of all persons interested in a controversy to be joined in any
suits involving that controversy. Hazard, supra note 2, at 1257. Further, the prevailing
rule, providing that a suit abated at the death of a party, practically required the suit to
be started all over again. See Brown v. Howard, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (Ch. 1701). Hence, if
one were suing a great many persons, all of whom had to be joined because each was
interested in the controversy, the necessary/indispensable party rule required that all be
served as parties, but the death abatement principle made it virtually impossible to com-
ply. Hazard, supra note 2, at 1260-62. The class action device provided a way out of
this catch-22 situation. Id. at 1260-66. In the well publicized case of Adair v. New
River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1805), which was heavily relied upon by Justice
Story in formulating his views on class actions (see West v. Randall, 29 F.Cas. 718
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424)), Lord Eldon recognized the necessary/indispensable
party rule, but insisted that if it was applied where it were actually impracticable to
bring all such parties into the action, the very purpose of the rule, to achieve substantialjustice for all interested parties, would be defeated. Lord Eldon did not follow the nec-
essary/indispensable party rule but, nonetheless, held that the absentees were bound
because those before the court were "so many, that it can be justly said, they will fairly
and honestly try the legal right between themselves, all other persons interested, and the
Plaintiff.. . ." Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. at 1159. An early American
example of the interrelationship of the class action device and the necessary/indispensa-
ble party rule can be found in Sprague v. Stevens, 37 R.I. 1, 91 A. 43 (1914), where
Rhode Island joinder rules required joinder of all landowners in a suit to claim dower
rights, while the death abatement principle prevented the many hundreds of parties
from being served. The court eventually permitted those served to represent the un-
named new landowners.
Today, rule 19 recognizes the class action as an exception to the rigors of its provi-
sions. Rule 19(d) states: "This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23." FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(d).
194. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 90-94 (rule 19) and 98-107 (rule 23).
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(multiple suits with varying results and perhaps multiple liabil-
ity).195 Rule 23(b)(1) provides a means of litigating such a contro-
versy without the necessity of joining numerous necessary and
indispensable parties while still achieving the goals of rule 19.
Hence, rule 23(b)(1) works, as does rule 19, to protect the defendant
from multiple suits, inconsistent adjudications and multiple liability
and to protect the interests of absentees (to limited funds). 196 The
purpose of rule 23(b)(1) would be undermined if absentees were able
to opt out. The only reason Larionoff was maintained as a (b)(1)
class action 97 was because the government stated that if it lost on
195. Id. at 91. When a person, not joined, will as a practical matter, be adversely
affected by the judgment, that person is a necessary party or a rule 19(a) person. If that
person cannot be joined and complete relief cannot be obtained without his/her pres-
ence, or despite the shaping of relief a judgment will adversely affect that person, then
the matter ought to be dismissed, that person being an indispensable party or rule 19(b)
person. See generally Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102 (1968).
196. Protecting the defendant and courts from multiplicity of suits over the same
issues is certainly one of the primary reasons for the creation of the class suit. See supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
Protecting absentees' interests in limited funds has, even at the inception of the class
suit, been one of its chief aims. Indeed, so strong was this concern, that certain actions
were not permitted to proceed unless brought on behalf of the class rather than individ-
ual members of the class. In Leigh v. Thomas, 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch. 1751), two crew
members of a privateer ship brought suits for their share of prize-money. (Privateers
were mercenaries who fought with the regular British Navy and were paid prize-money;
See generally G. WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE LIVERPOOL PRIVATEERS AND LETTERS
OF MARQUE WITH AN AccouNT OF THE LIVERPOOL SLAVE TRADE (1897)). The
Chancellor, in dismissing the suit, indicated that it must be brought on behalf of all
crew members:
No doubt but a bill may be by a few creditors in behalf of themselves and the
rest, to have an account of real and personal estate for relief of all; and then
the decree lets in all the others; and they are considered as plaintiffs, that bill
not being confined to a select number: but there is no instance of a bill by
three or four to have an account of the estate, without saying they bring it in
behalf of themselves and the rest of the creditors: otherwise the executor may
account to all the other creditors in other bills.
Leigh, 28 Eng. Rep. at 201.
Justice Story suggested that such a situation compels class treatment so as to avoid
unfairness to other creditors (unequal distribution) and avoid unfairness to the defend-
ant who would suffer multiple suits by other creditors. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS
99 (9th ed. 1879).
Further, in Terry v. Little, 101 U.S. 216, 217-18 (1879), Chief Justice Waite, speaking
on the subject, said:
So, too, it is clear that the obligation is one that may be enforced by the credi-
tors; but as it is to or for all creditors, it must be enforced by or for all. The
form of the action, therefore, should be one adapted to the protection of all. A
suit at law by one creditor to recover for himself alone is entirely inconsistent
with any idea of distribution.
See generally old rule 23(a)(2), FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939), and Professor
Moore's discussion of the hybrid class suit, Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551 (1937); Meore, Fed-
eral Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307 (1937); Moore, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdic-
tion and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555 (1938).
197. The court, in a long detailed footnote, expressed doubt as to the propriety of
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the merits then it was obliged to apply the ruling, regardless of the
principle of resjudicata, equally to all those similarly situated. 198
Because the Larionoff plaintiffs sought money damages rather
than injunctive relief, the (b)(2) classification was unavailable. 199
maintaining the suit as a (o)(1)(A) suit and suggested that it might better be categorized
as a (b)(1)(B) suit. Since the suit did not fit the (b)(2) category (see infra note 199 and
accompanying text), and plaintiff obviously wanted to avoid the rigors of a (b)(3) suit,
the court shrugged and said, "[i]n any event, the failure of the Government to challenge
on appeal the propriety of the class designation eliminates the need for us to resolve that
issue." Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1181-82 n.36.
198. If Mr. Larionoff lost, and lost on appeal, then others in his situation (other
class members) would as a practical matter (the stare decisis effect of the Larionoff loss)
be affected by the disposition of the Larionoff suit. This type of issue was presented in
LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973) wherein the
court said:
Neither the stare dedsis consequences of an individual action nor the possibil-
ity of false reliance upon the improper initiation of a class action can supply
either the practical disposition of the rights of the class, or the substantial
impairment of those rights, at least one of which is required by Rule
23(b)(1)(B). To permit them to do so would make the invocation of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) unchallengeable. There is no indication in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note that any such "boot/strap" effect was intended.
See also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.10 (9th Cir.
1976). The government nonetheless argued that it was required to treat all class mem-
bers alike, so that win or lose, the result would apply directly to the benefit or detriment
of the class regardless of resjudicata.
The position of the government is at odds with the facts. First, the government cer-
tainly doesn't always abide by a court determination and apply the results class-wide.
Remember, despite the Gregory court order, the government refused to reclassify Greg-
ory class members, forcing each class member to sue to enforce the Gregory order. In-
deed, the government was accused of acting lawlessly in the face of the Gregory order,
almost disposing one court to uphold the reclassification order on that ground alone.
Shrader v. Selective Serv. Sys., 470 F.2d 73, 77 (7th Cir. 1972) (Eschbach, J., dissent-
ing); see generally supra note 109. In Larionoff, the court noted that the issue concern,
ing the sailors' contract rights was litigated and decided in other courts.
This identical question was recently presented. . . to the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, . . . to the District Court for the District of
Hawaii,. . . to the District Court for the Southern District of California, ...
and to the District Court for the District of Connecticut. . . . Those courts
reached the same conclusion as we reach today.
We are aware that the Fourth Circuit has reversed the District Court [for
the District of Connecticut] on the ground [of contract construction].
Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1180 n.35. Perhaps as President Nixon once threatened, the
government required a "definitive opinion," rather than merely four district court opin-
ions and a circuit court of appeals opinion.
In any event, if the government will apply individual decisions which have national
implications to all parties similarly situated, then perhaps the district courts ought to
require that the action proceed as a class action. If, indeed the class will be directly
affected by the result, the class would appear to fit within the (b)(1) category (the neces-
sary/indispensable party category, see supra note 196). As with the limited fund cases,
it may be best to protect the class by securing for it the main reason for the prerequisites
listed in rule 23(a), to wit: adequate representation. Of course, adequate representation
may properly be discounted when plaintiff is made an involuntary representative of a
class. If plaintiff declines the court's invitation, then the court ought to appoint other
counsel, at the government's expense, to represent the absentees' interests, since it is the
government's position that the individual case becomes the test case for the class.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) states: "()... An action may be maintained as a
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Rule (b)(2) class actions (overlapping with (b)(1)(A) class actions)
are primarily maintained against a common enemy when common
relief is sought, such as Title VII actions to enjoin civil rights viola-
tions.2°° It would be highly impractical, if not impossible, for a de-
fendant to be enjoined in one suit and not in others, or ordered to
act a certain way in one suit and yet a different way in another. The
class suit is, therefore, not only essential to victims of civil rights
violations, but is also quite helpful to defendants. Further, judicial
administration is streamlined and legitimized because multiple suits
over similar, complex issues resulting in inconsistent adjudications
are avoided. If in these suits, members of the class were able to opt
out, those salutary effects would not be achieved. 20 1 However, as
the court correctly perceived, the fact that a class member is not
class action if. . .(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole .. "
The ACN states that this "subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." ACN, supra note
79, 39 F.R.D. at 102. It is "final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding
declaratory nature" that is involved in the (b)(2) category. Id.
In Larionoff, the plaintiffs requested, in addition to the $700,000 in money damages,
that "the contracts of the plaintiffs be deemed rescinded and declared of no furtherforce
and effect." Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1180 (emphasis in original). The district court re-
jected this claim and the Larionoff court affirmed, stating that "[tihe payment of
[money] to the plaintiffs is an adequate legal remedy, and we have been offered no
evidence indicating that there are exceptional circumstances in this case that justify the
grant of equitable relief." Id. at 1181.
It seems clear that subsection (b)(2) of rule 23 was inapplicable. Rule 23(b)(3) was
clearly the appropriate subdivision, but forced by that subdivision to order pendency
notice (rule 23 (c)(2)), the Larionoff court accepted the district court's unchallenged
designation. See supra note 197.
200. As the ACN to rule 23(b)(2) explains, "[i]llustrative [of (b)(2) class actions] are
various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating
unlawfully against a class .. " ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
201. Class members who opt out of the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions destroy the
purpose of those class actions, to wit: to finally resolve the contest at one time so that
all class members are treated fairly (i.e., limited fund type action), and the defendant is
not faced with multiple suits, liability or court orders requiring standards of conduct
which are incompatible. Worse, the defendant gains little from a win (stare decisis on a
legal issue which is appealed) and loses a great deal if an individual member of the class
wins.
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel was first modified by the Supreme Court in
Blonder-Tongue v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-27 (1971), where the Court
quoted from and used the reasoning of Justice Traynor's famous opinion in Bernhard v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), wherein the
California Supreme Court abandoned the mutuality doctrine. See supra note 118.
Hence, as Justice Stevens (then judge) said in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 701
(7th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted): "From the standpoint of defendant. . . there seems
to be little difference between a class determination after the ruling on the merits and a
test case brought by an individual litigant followed promptly by a class action if the
individual should prevail." Therefore, a smart individual would opt out of the (b)(1)
and (b)(2) class, wait and hope that the class prevailed, and, if so, use collateral estoppel
against the defendant and obtain the same result as the class. Or, if the class lost, the
individual not bound by the judgment against the class because she/he opted out, would
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permitted to opt out of the class does not necessarily mean that
notice of the pendency of the suit should not be provided to mem-
bers of the class.
Moving to the pendency notice issue, the court in Larionoff de-
cided to follow those cases which, in reliance on Eisen IV and
Sosna, have not required pendency notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class
actions. 20 2 However, it did so only after quoting and adopting the
analysis of Professors Wright and Miller concerning the differences
between (b)(1) & (2) class actions and (b)(3) class actions which, the
court reasoned, warrant and justify different treatment concerning
pendency notice. That analysis, because it was and continues to be
relied upon, deserves repetition here:
In representative actions brought under [23(b)(1) and (2)], the
class generally will be more cohesive-for example, in many in-
stances each member will be affected as a practical matter by ajudgment obtained by another member if individual actions were
instituted. Similarly, it is less likely that there will be special de-
fenses or issues relating to individual members of a Rule 23(b)(1)
or Rule 23(b)(2) class, than in the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.
This means that there is less reason to be concerned about each
member of the class having an opportunity to be present. Thus,
in suits under subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2), once the court deter-
mines that the members are adequately represented as required
by Rule 23(a)(4), it is reasonably certain that the named repre-
sentatives will protect the absent members and give them the
functional equivalent of a day in court.
In keeping with this philosophy, class members in Rule
23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not provided an opportu-
nity by the rule to exclude themselves from the action as is true
in Rule 23(b)(3) actions. Because they do not have the alterna-
tive of bringing a separate suit, notice really serves only to allow
those members the opportunity to decide if they want to inter-
vene or to monitor the representation of their rights. 20 3
The court concluded by noting that:
Unlike the situation with respect to members of a Rule 23(b)(3)
prosecute the same matter in the hope that a different court or jury would decide the
other way.
As Justice Stevens suggested, this permits the class to manipulate the judicial system
by sending individual class members out to fight the defendant in the hope that one of
them will win, thereby permitting the class to use collateral estoppel to obtain the same
result. If the individual lost, the class and other individual class members could still
litigate in an attempt to obtain a better result. The Supreme Court has clearly aban-
doned the mutuality doctrine so that this scenario would likely be common rather than
aberrant. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
202. Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1185-86. Actually the court followed its own former
opinion in Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
although Judge McGowan, writing for the court, did thoroughly survey the district and
circuit court opinions on both sides of the issue.
203. Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1186 n.44.
[Vol. 22
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class, the members of a Rule 23(b)(1) class are likely to be more
unified in the sense that there will probably be little interest on
the part of individual members in controlling and directing their
own separate litigation on the question at issue in the class
suit.204
The court's conclusion has little to do with reality and indeed
little to do with theory.20 5 As indicated earlier, the force which
binds (b)(1) members is not their cohesiveness. Indeed, it may very
well be the individual member's selfish interest which compels the
(b)(1) action and its binding effect. 20 6 "In various situations an ad-
judication as to one or more members of the class will necessarily
. . . have an adverse practical effect on the interests of other mem-
bers who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit. 20 7 On the
other hand it may be the defendant's unenviable position (multiple
lawsuits-inconsistent standards) which requires that a (b)(1) lawsuit
be binding on the class. "The class action device can be used effec-
tively to obviate the actual or virtual dilemma which would thus
confront the [defendant]."20 8 Therefore, it is not the cohesive na-
ture of the class or lack of interest in directing one's own litigation
which prohibits exclusion of class members and thereby dispenses
with the need for providing pendency notice in order to bind the
class. On the contrary, if anything it is the strong individual inter-
ests of class members and the individual interest of the defendant
that compel class treatment.
The question which the court failed to answer is why Eisen and
204. Id. at 1186.
205. See supra note 193, which briefly traces the relationship of the necessary/indis-
pensable party rule and the emergence of the class device including present rules
23(b)(1) and 19. That history and the present rules refute the court's conclusion. Even
under old rule 23(a)(1) and (2), the so-called true and hybrid class actions, the court
picks up no support. Under the old rule 23(a)(1) (the true class), class members were
joint obligees or join obligors and each member's interest was identical to the other
because under the necessary/indispensable party rule all members had to be joined un-
less the action proceeded as a class action. Hence, the true class was bound by the
result. Old rule 23(a)(2) (the hybrid class), was created to ensure equal distribution of a
debtor's assets to creditors. A single creditor sued for all on the liability issue and then,
after notice, other creditors came in to the suit and the fund was distributed. Those
creditors that declined the invitation could still maintain a separate suit against the
debtor, although those assets of the debtor which had been distributed in the class suit
were no longer available to such creditors.
The common law, the old equity rules, the old rule 23 and present rule 23 all strongly
suggest that the individual member of (b)(1) type action has every reason to want to
litigate first and separate from the class. By doing so, the individual controls the litiga-
tion rather than leaving it to unknown and possibly less capable litigants, who may
present weak cases and/or hire the least able lawyers. Further, if a limited fund is
involved, the litigant who wins first may see 100 cents on the dollar rather than a pro
rata share distributed amongst class members.
206. See supra notes 193 and 196.
207. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 101.
208. Id. at 100.
1985]
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his (b)(3) class are any less cohesive than the Larionoff (b)(1) class
or the Gregory (b)(2) class. On the initial issue of liability, all class
actions--(b)(1), (2) & (3)-are cohesive by definition.209  Eisen
hoped the district court would find that the defendants violated the
antitrust laws by fixing the price of their commission rate.210 On
this issue, all class members had the identical interest. As with La-
rionoff, once the liability issue was decided, money damages could
then be determined.211 In Gregory, once liability was determined an
injunction issued. However, in Gregory the issue of fatherhood
deferments to all members of the class was a far more important
concern to class members than the loss or gain of $70. Yet in Greg-
ory, all courts agree that pendency notice is not constitutionally re-
quired.212 Pasquier, Schrader, McCarthy, Germonprez, Zeilstra
and others like them, would certainly have preferred to choose their
own champion, on their local turf, to argue whether they might re-
main home with their wives and children rather than go fight in
Vietnam. But they were given no choice. Eisen and his class must
be given a choice simply because each wants $70. Larionoff escaped
the imposition of pendency notice cost even though his class sought
$700,000 in money damages, merely because the court held that the
209. Rule 23(a)(l)-(4) requires, as a prerequisite to each class action, inter alia, that
the class members share common questions of law or fact and that the claims or de-
fenses of the class members be the same. The main, if not the only, question in a (b)(1)
and (2) class action is the class-wide liability of the defendant. For instance, did the
government classify registrants properly? Did the government pay sailors in accord-
ance with an enlistment contract? If the liability issue is decided favorably to the class,
an injunction or declaratory relief follows or, in addition to such relief, monetary relief
is provided based upon class-wide proof or the presentation of individual claims. See
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975) and infra notes 229-230
and accompanying text. In a (b)(3) action, by definition the main question common to
the class must "predominate over any questions affecting individual members." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Indeed "[t]he court is required to find, as a condition of [the (b)(3)
class action], that the questions common to the class predominate over questions affect-
ing individual members .... [Hence] a fraud.. . by the use of similar misrepresenta-
tions [is appropriate for class resolution] despite the need, if liability is found, for
separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class." ACN,
supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
210. Eisen IV, 417 U.S. 156, 158. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
211. It appears that the government was going to pay each sailor who re-enlisted
under the program which formed the basis of the suit without any need for individual
claims and/or adjudications. The plaintiffs in Larionoff requested that the government
disclose the names and addresses of the members of the Larionoff class. The plaintiffs
appeared to seek this information without suggesting a reason for its disclosure. The
government did not want the names and addresses of those persons disclosed. The
district court denied plaintiffs' request and the court of appeals affirmed because plain-
tiffs had not explained why "a disclosure order would be necessary to protect the inter-
est of absent class members. . . ." Larionoff, 533 F.2d at 1187. It therefore can be
concluded that the district court, without evidence to the contrary, believed the govern-
ment would pay each class member what she/he was entitled to, without the need for
plaintiff to monitor the method the government used in determining who was paid, and
how much.
212. See supra notes 166-176 and accompanying text.
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class was a (b)(1) class. Yet in Larionoff because of the amount of
each member's stake, each member may have preferred to pursue
his/her claim individually-whereas Eisen and his class will never
seek nor obtain redress without the class device.
Larionoff is no more a (b)(1) action than Eisen. Both sought a
determination that defendant had violated the law. A class win
would require the members of the class to come forward and/or
otherwise claim and prove entitlement to damages based upon the
proven class liability.213 Looking at the definition of the (b)(1)(B)
class, the question to consider is whether adjudication of individual
claims will "as a practical matter be dispositive. . . or impair..
the interests of other class members.2 14
First, let us examine what would happen if Eisen or Larionoff
class members pursued individual actions and prevailed. Since both
Eisen and Larionoff did not involve limited funds, individual judg-
ments would not disproportionately distribute assets.215 Hence, an
individual member's win could only benefit the class (whether
(b)(1), (2) or (3)) because of the abandonment of the mutuality doc-
trine.216 That is, strangers with claims consisting of identical issues
(price fixing/bonus money) may use collateral estoppel to prove,
without litigation, that defendant price-fixed or unlawfully denied
bonus money. On the other hand, if the individual class member
lost his/her action and lost the legal issue on appeal, then stare deci-
sis would operate against future litigants on the same issue resolved
on appeal. But that by itself has never been a reason for permitting
(b)(1)(B) treatment of a class, for if it were, then all class actions
including Eisen would be of that variety.217 Indeed, it is precisely
because of the stare decisis problem that Larionoff (and Gregory)
may very well wish to pursue their own claims first so as not to be
bound by the efforts of those they did not choose, whereas the Eisen
class members have every reason to hope a representative will take
up their cause, because they cannot do it alone.
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) applies when individual adjudications may vary
"establish[ing] incompatible standards of conduct" for the defend-
213. In both Eisen IV and Larionoff, it was possible to determine the amount of
damages by merely examining the defendant's records. Hence, in Larionoff the govern-
ment re-enlistment records, if accurate, would determine the persons who should be
paid. See supra note 211. In Eisen IV, the defendants' records should indicate who
should be paid and how much (based upon the number of transactions of each class
member for the relevant period and the amount of overcharge on each commission
paid). For a discussion of the methods used to determine class wide damage awards, see
5 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 9715c.
214. See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. See generally supra note 201.
217. LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973). See
supra note 198.
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ant. 218 It is inapplicable to both Eisen and Larionoff. Given two
suits by individuals, one which wins and one which loses, the de-
fendant in Larionoff must give bonus money in one and not the
other, and the defendant in Eisen must fork over $70 in one and not
the other. Providing money damages to one group of similarly situ-
ated persons and not another may be disconcerting to the defendant
but it does not establish incompatible standards of conduct;
although it surely counsels against conduct which causes such loss.
If mere inconsistent money judgments which involved the same
questions of law and fact were all it took, then all consumer class
actions would be of the (b)(1)(A) variety.
The results achieved by the courts are understandable. 219 Eisen
IV clearly held that rule 23(c)(2) commands individual pendency
notice be provided to ascertainable (b)(3) class members. Sosna
just as clearly indicated that neither the Constitution nor rule 23
requires pendency notice be provided to (b)(1) or (2) class members.
The federal courts are faced with a dilemma: either certify the ac-
tion as a (b)(3) class and effectively deprive the class and all its
members of a remedy because of the cost of pendency notice (Eisen
IV) or certify the action as a (b)(1) or (2) class, thereby dispensing
with the need for and cost of pendency notice so that class-wide
redress is permissible (Larionoff and Gregory). This dilemma is
presented most clearly when the plaintiff class sues under Title VII
(civil rights violations) 220 and requests damages in addition to, or in
lieu of, injunctive relief.
B. Why Pendency Notice in (b)(3) and Not (b)(2)?
A Third Circuit opinion which has received great notoriety pro-
vides an example of the contortions which the federal courts go
through in order to avoid depriving plaintiff class of a remedy by
compelling pendency notice and its consequent cost.2 21 In Wetzel v.
218. See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 221, 256 and accompanying text.
220. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1970) (as amended,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Supp. II, 1972)).
221. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975). See generally
Note, Civil Procedure-Class Action Suits-Applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) to Class Ac-
tions in Which the Need for Injunctive Relief Has Been Obviated-Wetzel v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 386 (1976); Rutherglen, Title VII Class Action,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 711 (1980); Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-
Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM L. REv. 292, 320
(1982); Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of Juris-
diction in Title VII Suits, 67 GEo. L.J. 811, 826 (1979); Steinman, The Party Status of
Absent Plaintiff Class Members: Vulnerability to Counterclaims, 69 GEo. L.J. 1171,
1199 (1981); Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-in to the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Acts Through the Fair Labor Standards Act,
71 GEO. L. J. 119, 140 (1982); Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested
[Vol. 22
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,222 two former female employees filed
suit with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission pursu-
ant to Title VII, alleging sex discrimination in the company's hiring
and promotion policies. Thereafter, the company changed its dis-
criminatory policies and offered the named plaintiffs promotions.
The women declined the offer and filed suit in the federal district
court requesting injunctive relief and back pay awards for present
and future employees on a nationwide basis. 223 The district court
certified the class as a (b)(2) class action and refused to order pen-
dency notice or recertify the class under the (b)(3) category. 224 "No
notice had been sent to any member of the class as of the date of
[the] appeal. ' 225 The district court granted partial summary judg-
ment, ruling that the company's policies had violated Title VII, but
denied injunctive relief because the company had discontinued
those policies.226 Since injunctive relief was unnecessary, the circuit
court, framing the inquiry in Shakespearean terms, said, "[w]hether
(b)(2) or not (b)(2) is indeed the question. '227 The company vigor-
ously contended that the matter could proceed only as a (b)(3) class
action since only damages (back pay awards) were involved and
therefore pendency notice to ascertainable class members was re-
quired. The circuit court first held that the action was properly
certified as a (b)(2) class action and, second, held that due process
did not require pendency notice in (b)(2) class actions. The court
reasoned as follows:
A (b)(2) suit is permitted when the opposing party has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class....
By its very nature, a (b)(2) class must be cohesive as to those
claims tried in the class action .... Because of the cohesive na-
ture of the class, Rule 23(c)(3) contemplates that all members of
the class will be bound.
By the very nature of a heterogeneous (b)(3) class, there would
be many instances where a particular individual would not want
to be included as a member of the class. To respect these individ-
ual interests, Rule 23(c)(2) was written to afford an opportunity
to every potential member to opt out of the class. . . For the
Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 492, 514 (1982); Diver, The Judge As Political Pawn-
broker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 67
(1979); Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L.
REV. 11, 23 (1983); Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 46(4) LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 189, 193 (1983); Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 595 (1983).
222. 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975).
223. Id. at 244.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 245.
227. Id. at 248.
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opt out procedure to be effective, 23(c)(2) also provides for notice
to be sent to all potential members prior to the final determina-
tion of the class.
, * . With the potential unfairness to members of the (b)(3)
class eliminated by the opt out procedure, 23(c)(3) contemplates
that all members of the (b)(3) class, as well as members of the
(b)(2) class, will be bound by the res judicata effect of the
judgment.228
Because the company acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, 229 the court concluded that the action
was a (b)(2) action and that the back pay awards were merely part
of the equitable relief envisioned by Title VII actions.230 The court
avoided pulling the pendency notice trigger by simply characteriz-
ing the action as a (b)(2) action rather than a (b)(3) action, even
though no injunctive relief was ordered. It was precisely this sort of
fudging or misuse of the old rule 23 categories of class actions that
led to the adoption of the present rule 23.231
228. Id. at 248-50 (citations and footnotes omitted).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
230. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 250-51.
231. Professor Moore, noting that the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
did not deal specifically with class actions, drafted a rule which he hoped would solve
problems concerning joinder, subject matter jurisdiction, and the resjudicata effect of
class judgments. Professor Moore divided class actions into three categories, true, hy-
brid and spurious. The true type class action compelled joinder of all interested per-
sons, such as joint obligees/obligors, common right holders (creditors given a common
right, rather than an individual right, to enforce liability), and shareholders in a share-
holder derivative suit. The hybrid type class action involved several rights where the
object of the actions affected the disposition of specific property in which all were inter-
ested. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By the Prelimi-
nary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 570-71 (1937). The difference between the true and
hybrid is suggested to be that a "true class suit" decree binds all and must involve a
fund in which all plaintiffs have a common interest, but a hybrid action, that does not
bind all, involves a personal liability of the money. The hybrid action is assimilated to a
proceeding in rem. Note, Recurrent Problems in Action Brought on Behalf of a Class, 34
COLuM. L. REv. 118, 133 (1934). The spurious category defined rights that were sev-
eral where common questions of law or fact were involved. This category was nothing
more than a permissive joinder device, enabling large numbers of litigants to bypass
diversity requirements by permitting the courts to look to the named plaintiff's citizen-
ship rather than the intervening class members' citizenship. The judgment rendered in
the spurious action was conclusive only on parties that joined, not on absentees. Moore,
supra, at 575.
Moore's final proposal dealt specifically with the effect of a class judgment; it stated:
(b) Effect of Judgment. The judgment rendered in the first situation is con-
clusive upon the class; in the second situation it is conclusive upon all parties
and privies to the proceeding. . . insofar as [it does] or may affect specific
property involved in the proceeding; and in the third situation it is conclusive
upon only the parties and privies to the proceeding.
Moore, supra, at 571. The final draft of the rules omitted Moore's labels and their
consequent effects. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), (2) & (3) (1939) (old rule). Despite
this omission, the courts read his labels and the consequences he attributed to each
category into the then newly adopted rule 23. Concerning this omission by the drafters
of the rule and resurrection by the courts of Moore's proposed subsection on the effects
of judgments, one commentator stated:
[Vol. 22
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Old rule 23 provided three different categories of class actions.
The "true" (old rule 23(a)(1)) and "hybrid" (old rule 23(a)(2)) class
actions were binding on all class members while the "spurious" (old
rule 23(a)(3)) was not.232 Eventually, the federal courts used
(abused) these categories as a way of describing a result which they
sought to achieve rather than a method of achieving proper deci-
sions pursuant to the definitions of each category. 233 In a similar
manner, the approach of the court in Wetzel benefited the class and
vindicated government policy but only by "dint of depriving the
[definition of a (b)(2) class] of coherent meaning. '234
Having decided that (c)(2) notice was not applicable, the court
next had to deal with whether any type of pendency notice was con-
stitutionally required even though not required by the rule. Once
again it was the cohesive/homogeneous nature of the (b)(2) class
upon which the court relied in concluding that notice was not con-
stitutionally required. As the court explained:
In the instant case, determination of liability on the part of Lib-
erty Mutual to each member of the class depends on whether it
discriminated on the basis of sex. This question is common to
the claims of all members of the class....
The very nature of a (b)(2) class is that it is homogeneous
without any conflicting interests between the members of the
class. Since the class is cohesive, its members would be bound
either by the collateral estoppel or the stare decisis effect of a suit
brought by an individual plaintiff. Thus, as long as the represen-
tation is adequate and faithful, there is no unfairness in giving res
His recommendation was rejected by the Committee as a matter of substance
beyond the scope of the rules of procedure, but the courts have virtually
adopted the excluded paragraph in deciding cases. Even assuming the Com-
mittee to be correct, one might challenge the wisdom of assembling so elabo-
rate a mechanism and omitting its engine.
Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818,
824 (1946). Moore's definitions, or more precisely, the old rule 23 categories, were not
easy to apply. "In practice the terms [in old rule 23(a)(1), (2) and (3)] . ..proved
obscure and uncertain. . . The courts had considerable difficulty with these terms."
ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 98. Courts classified actions depending upon the
effect of the judgment which was wanted, reaching results "by dint of depriving [these
terms] of coherent meaning." Id.
The present rule 23 was enacted so as to describe class actions in "practical terms" so
that classification will be easy and judgments will be binding. Id. See also Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 1, at 255-56; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 707-14 (1941).
232. See supra note 231.
233. Id. See also supra note 79, Binding Effect of Class Actions, at 1062-65.
234. The courts arrived at results which they desired "by dint of depriving" the
definitional terms of old rule 23 "of coherent meaning." ACN, supra note 79, 39
F.R.D. at 98. As one commentator observed, "Analysis of the cases engenders a suspi-
cion that the generic appellations derived from Rule 23(a) are used to describe results
rather than reach decisions." Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision ofRule
23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. at 823. See generally supra note 231.
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judicata effect to a judgment against all members of the class
even if they have not received notice. Adequacy of representa-
tion of the class is a mandatory requirement for the maintenance
of a class action under Rule 23(a). If the representation proves
inadequate, members of the class would not be bound. [Hans-
berry; Gonzales].235
The rhetoric is superficially convincing and the equities are in
favor of permitting redress by avoiding pendency notice costs.
Hence, most circuit courts adhere to the Third Circuit's view.236
Yet, despite the salutary effect of the court's reasoning on civil
235. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 255-56.
236. So long as the class is seeking injunctive and or declaratory relief (pursuant to
Title VII), the fact that additional relief in the form of back pay damage awards is
sought has not caused the courts to alter the fundamental character of the class suits-
hence, suits remain (b)(2) type actions and therefore do not compel the individual pen-
dency notice mechanism associated with the (b)(3) action. See supra note 133 and ac-
companying text.
However, because such suits contain features of both the (b)(2) (injunctive) and (b)(3)
(money damage) actions, some courts have dealt with these "hybrid" class actions using
a Solomon type approach. A lengthy, rambling and mostly confusing discussion of this
hybrid class suit can be found in Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th
Cir. 1983). In Holmes many class members objected to the monetary features of the
settlement and claimed a right to opt out of the settlement and pursue their claims
individually. The court canvassed the cases which dealt with these "hybrid" class ac-
tions and agreed that such actions are (b)(2) actions. It therefore concluded that rule
23's mandatory individual pendency notice provision was inapplicable. In light of the
individual damages claims sought by class members and such members' desire to press
those claims individually and not join in the settlement, the court, using the discretion-
ary powers provided by section (d) of the rule, concluded that notice must be provided
to each claimant/class member and that: "Such claimants must be permitted to exclude
themselves from the class and must be given an opportunity to prove entitlement to a
larger individual award in the same court that hears the claims of the class." Id. at
1160.
The court, on the facts of the case, merely required post-judgment notice, that is,
notice to class members that the class has prevailed on the discrimination issue and that
the class will seek money damages for each class member unless an individual member
opts out and seeks such damages him/herself in the same court. This approach is not
only fair to each class member, but may indeed be required by the due process clause.
Even in a (b)(3) class action, once the liability issue is determined, notice would be
required if it is necessary for class members to prove individual damage claims in order
to obtain the benefits of the proven class-wide liability. Hence, this type of notice is not
pendency notice, rather it is post judgment notice-provided to enable the class member
to choose whether he/she wishes to (1) exclude him/herself and relinquish all claims to
money damages, (2) exclude him/herself and proceed to litigate or otherwise resolve the
issue of individual damage claims, or (3) permit the class representative to settle the
damage issue on a specified basis.
The Holmes court arrived at the appropriate result, but only after a useless analysis of
the homogenous/heterogeneous distinction to which courts adhere in order to justify
the imposition of the pendency notice requirement in a (b)(3) case and avoid the same in
the (b)(l) & (2) cases. Since pendency notice was not ordered by the Holmes court,
reliance on that supposed distinction was unnecessary and confused the issue of the type
of notice ordered. Worse yet, it reinforced the validity of the distinction by adding yet
another circuit court to the list of authorities which adhere to that rationale. As the
count increases, changes become more difficult. Justice Field, speaking of the Swift
doctrine, the pre-Erie doctrine (Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) which
was the law of the federal courts for almost 100 years before being overruled, under-
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rights plaintiff class actions, when analyzed and compared with a
typical (b)(3) class action, the court's reasoning comes up short.
For our discussion, the question, to paraphrase the court, is why
(b)(2) and not (b)(3)? If Eisen sought an injunction from future
price fixing as (b)(2) clearly permits,237 would that sleight of hand
have magically transformed his heterogeneous class into a homoge-
neous class so that he would no longer be forced to pay the
$315,000 pendency notice cost? And, if Eisen also added a request
for damages as Wetzel did, the primary feature of the action would
remain the same, to wit: the defendants in Eisen acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class. Indeed, the very
reason Eisen was a class action was that those common issues
predominated over all other issues leaving, as in Wetzel, the issue of
damages to be determined after the main event.238 Wetzel's reason-
ing can easily be used to fit Eisen. To paraphrase Circuit Judge
Rosenn:239
In the instant case, determination of liability on the part of [Jac-
queline & Carlisle] to each member of the class depends on
whether it [illegally price fixed]. This question is common to the
claims of all members of the class.
Since the class is cohesive, its members would be bound either
by collateral estoppel or the stare decisis effect of a suit brought
by an individual plaintiff. Etc ...
As stated earlier, a stranger cannot be bound by collateral estop-
pel or res judicata,24° so if Wetzel brought suit alone and lost, the
defendant would not be permitted to use collateral estoppel or res
scored the difficulty involved in changing an oft repeated principle when he stated in
Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893):
I am aware that what has been termed the [Swift Doctrine]... has been often
advanced in judicial opinions of this court. . . . I admit that learned judges
have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of
[deciding the issue]. And I confess that, moved and governed by the authority
of the great names of those judges, I have, myself, in many instances, un-
hesitatingly and confidently, but I think now erroneously, repeated the same
doctrine. But, notwithstanding the great names. .. and. . . the frequency
with which the doctrine has been reiterated [the doctrine should be overruled].
So too, as the homogeneous/heterogeneous distinction gathers endorsements, the sheer
numbers of them make it nearly impossible to question its validity.
237. The ACN to rule 23(b)(2) states in part:
Thus an action looking to specific or declaratory relief could be brought by a
numerous class of purchasers, say retailers of a given description, against a
seller alleged to have undertaken to sell to that class at prices higer than those
set for other purchasers, say retailers of another description, when the applica-
ble law forbids such a pricing differential.
ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
238. See supra note 209.
239. Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 255-56. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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judicata against other class members. If on appeal Wetzel lost on
the discrimination issue, then stare decisis, a matter of precedent,
would apply to other such suits (at least in that circuit). Likewise,
with Eisen, if he brought suit and lost, no stranger could be bound
by collateral estoppel or res judicata-and if on appeal he lost on
the price-fixing issue, then stare decisis would apply to any other
suits brought.
The other possibility-Wetzel sues alone and wins-is also not
distinguishable from Eisen. If she wins, others similarly situated
would likely be permitted to apply collateral estoppel against the
company and thereby litigate only the damage issue-the amount of
pay to which each is entitled under the facts of each individual's
case (non-hiring or non-promotion). The same is true for Eisen.
Although the court's reasoning applies with equal force to Eisen,
solely because Eisen is categorized as a (b)(3) action, Mr. Eisen
must pay $315,000 pendency notice costs in order to permit a class
member to either opt out or intervene. It is pure fantasy to think
that an Eisen class member would desire to opt out since no individ-
ual's stake is great enough to allow for the luxury of individual
prosecution and therefore no redress whatever will be obtained by
such a class member. "It is an axiom of modem social and eco-
nomic life that we all wish to command more of the world's wealth;
there is not much sense in asking someone whether he would rather
have one dollar or two." 241 And, of course, an Eisen class member
could not possibly afford the time, money and effort necessary in
order to monitor the action, sift through the court file, investigate
the class attorneys, and plaintiffs' motives and interests and/or in-
tervene in the action "through his counsel. ' 242
C. Adequate Representation Protects All Absent Class Members
Perhaps it is reflective of our capitalist society to provide greater
"safeguards" when money is at stake. In truth, it is the nature of
the human character, at least in our society, that makes the (b)(3)
(money damage) class the most homogeneous while the (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes are least homogeneous. The issues which confront the
court in a (b)(1) and (b)(2) action are of such great importance that
it is more likely that the individual would rather pursue his/her
241. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 1111. It is extremely unlikely that such a class
member would not want redress. While counter-examples can be conjured up, they are
fanciful and reflect aberrant, not typical behavior. As Justice Rehnquist said when
pondering whether or not the class in Sosna was of sufficiently similar interest, it is
"difficult to imagine why any persons in the class. . . would have an interest in seeing
[Iowa's residency statute] upheld." Sosna, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975). See also
supra note 174.
242. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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claim alone. Moreover, the individual's interest in the outcome will
vary in those actions. Some class members will want less, more or
none of what the class representative is requesting. This is only nat-
ural, since those class actions deal with political and social issues
and, therefore, reflect the diversity of opinion which exists on such
issues in our society. 243 Yet the courts categorize these groups as
homogeneous, while the money groups are categorized as heteroge-
neous. If anything, it is the other way around.
Depending on the facts of the particular case a group may be
more or less homogeneous/heterogeneous in interest. The impor-
tance of the prerequisites listed in rule 23(a), the threshold inquir-
ies, are to guard against material conflicts and assure homogeneity
of interest by requiring that "questions . . . common to the class"
are involved, that "the claims . . . of the representative . . . are
typical of the claims. . . of the class," and most importantly, that
"the representative. . . will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class." 244 In addition to rule 23(a) safeguards, the dis-
trict court "may make appropriate orders. . . for the protection of
the members of the class" 245 and, at any time prior to the merit
decision, the action may be decertified if in the best interest of the
class.246 Moreover, the action may not be dismissed or settled with-
243. See Bell, supra note 45.
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides:
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent per-
sons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar proce-
dural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and
may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides: "(1) As soon as practicable after the com-
mencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." See also supra note
94.
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out court approval and notice to the class. 247 The combination of
these procedural safeguards assures the requisite homogeneity of in-
terest, whether a (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) class action, so that it is fair
to say that the absentee received his/her day in court, i.e., the ab-
sentee was adequately represented.
Long before the Supreme Court held that (b)(1) and (2) class ac-
tions constitutionally require adequate representation of class mem-
bers, rather than pendency notice to class members, the Fifth
Circuit in Gonzales v. Cassidy24 underscored the preeminent role
played by the adequacy of representation requirement of rule
23(a)(4) and the Hansberry decision. The question before the court
was whether Gonzales and the class were bound by the res judicata
effect of a prior class suit brought by Gaytan involving the same
class, the same defendant and the same issues.249 The court noted
that mandatory pendency notice was not given nor required to be
given to class members in the first suit because it was a (b)(2) rather
than a (b)(3) action, stating: "[A]s a result of these distinctions
class members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions must necessarily rely on
the representative to protect their interests. '250 The court held that
due process would be violated "unless the court applying res judi-
cata can conclude that the class was adequately represented in the
first suit. ' 251 With this in mind, the court advanced a two pronged
inquiry:
(1) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine, ini-
tially, that the representative would adequately represent the
class? and, (2) Does it appear, after the termination of the suit,
that the class representative adequately protected the interest of
the class? The first question involves us in a collateral review of
the Gaytan trial court's determination to permit the suit to pro-
ceed as a class action with Gaytan as the representative, while
the second involves a review of the class representative's conduct
of the entire suit-an inquiry which is not required to be made
by the trial court but which is appropriate in a collateral attack
on the judgment such as we have here.252
247. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." See also supra note 94.
248. 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). See supra note 110.
249. Id. at 69.
250. Id. at 74 n.12. The implication of the reasoning is that a (b)(3) class member
who must receive notice and an option to exclude him/herself, can protect him/herself
by opting out, intervening and or monitoring the suit before doing either. As discussed
earlier, economics precludes most, if not all, class members from doing either and,
therefore, the notice rule only provides an obstacle to the redress of substantive rights.
See supra notes 134-38, 241-42 and accompanying text.
251. Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 74.
252. Id. at 72.
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As to the first inquiry, the court concluded that the district
court's initial rule 23(a)(4) determination was correct because "(1)
the representative . . .[had] common interests with the unnamed
members of the class; and (2) it. . .appear[ed] that the renresenta-
tive [would] vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through
qualified counsel. ' 253 However, reviewing the entire suit, with the
hindsight of the appellate process, the court noted that the judg-
ment in Gaytan was applied prospectively to each member of the
class except Gaytan, who alone received retrospective relief, and
that Gaytan did not pursue retrospective relief for any other class
member. The court, speaking through Judge Ingraham, concluded
that the representation was not adequate and, therefore, Gonzales
and the class was not bound by the Gaytan judgment.254
Since the two pronged test is to be utilized by reviewing courts,
the first inquiry appears to be a fruitless one. What purpose would
the first inquiry serve if the reviewing court determined that the
lower court was incorrect in its initial determination concerning ad-
equate representation, but the second inquiry nevertheless demon-
strated that the representative did in fact adequately represent the
class? In such a case, a judgment that went against the class should
certainly bind the class. Hence, a reviewing court need only use the
second prong of the test to determine the adequacy issue. However,
the first prong of Judge Ingraham's inquiry does serve to under-
score the great importance of the adequacy requirement and the
seriousness with which that issue ought to be treated by the district
courts. If the initial inquiry is made correctly, it is less likely that a
class action judgment will be subject to a collateral attack on the
ground of inadequate representation. 255
253. Id. (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 75.
255. To satisfy itself that the representation fulfills the requirements of rule 23(a)(4),
the district court must find that (I) the representative's interests and the unnamed
members' interests are common, and (2) the representative will vigorously prosecute the
interests of the class through qualified counsel. Id. at 72. Once this determination is
made, practical considerations will virtually always dictate that the entire representa-
tion will be adequate. First and foremost, neither plaintiff nor plaintifT's attorney will
be rewarded unless the action prevails or is settled favorably to the class with court
approval. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Additionally, the defendant
may challenge class certification on adequacy grounds at any time prior to a decision on
the merits. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) supra note 246. The defendant has a strong
incentive to make this challenge, for if the defendant prevails, no other class-wide relief
may be sought and, therefore, the defendant may escape class-wide relief. Further, the
class size will shrink because the statute of limitations will begin to run on individual
members' claims when the action is dismissed. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538 (1974). Any win or settlement for the defendant will only be as good as
the judgment is safe from collateral attack. Thus, the defendant will attempt to secure a
final result which will bind the class and which will be immune from attack on the
grounds of inadequacy of representation.
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III. THE PENDENCY NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23(b)(3)
ENCOURAGES MANIPULATION OF THE CLASS
MECHANISM BY THE PARTIES AND THE
COURTS
A. The Defendant is Placed in a No Win Situation
Larionoff and Wetzel are consistent with Gonzales in that each of
those circuit court opinions, albeit in different language, sought to
ensure that absent class members' interests were adequately repre-
sented. Each regarded pendency notice as a useless, costly proce-
dure which, instead of providing safety for absentees, created an
insurmountable and unnecessary procedural obstacle toward
achieving redress of substantive rights. Confined by the mandatory
pendency notice requirement when (b)(3) class actions are involved,
it is understandable that courts will stretch the language of (b)(1)
and (2) in order to avoid the (b)(3) category.
Paradoxically, other courts have embraced the (b)(3) category in
order to assist a plaintiff class, by holding that a prior class action in
which pendency notice was not provided to class members was not
res judicata (as the defendant contended), thereby permitting the
plaintiff class to obtain redress where it would otherwise be
barred.256 Recall that in Wetzel, it was the defendant that objected
to the lack of pendency notice to the plaintiff class. By holding that
notice was not required, the Wetzel court permitted the class to ob-
tain the redress to which it was found to be entitled.
In Johnson v. General Motors Corp.,257 the Fifth Circuit was con-
fronted with a collateral attack on a prior class judgment by the
plaintiff class which sought to escape the result of that prior judg-
ment. (The Fifth Circuit and the newly created Eleventh Circuit258
have heard most of the (b)(2) actions which request back pay
money awards in addition to injunctive relief). 259 In the prior suit,
Rowe, on behalf of the same class against the same defendant,
brought a Title VII class suit which sought and obtained certain
injunctive relief.26° "No class-wide monetary relief was sought or
granted in Rowe.'" 261 Johnson brought a class action suit requesting
additional injunctive relief and monetary relief. The district court
256. A similar practice by the courts under old rule 23 caused the promulgation of
the new rule 23. See ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 98-99; see also supra note 231.
257. 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979).
258. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was created on October 1, 1981 and
adopted as precedent all former Fifth Circuit cases. Holmes v. Continental Can Co.,
706 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983).
259. "These types of actions have especially blossomed in this Circuit." Penson v.
Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1981).
260. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 434.
261. Id.
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dismissed the case, holding that the Johnson action was barred by
the res judicata effect of the Rowe action. On appeal Johnson as-
serted, inter alia, that he and his class were not bound by Rowe
because pendency notice was not provided to the class and because
the Rowe named plaintiffs, who each received $1,000 in back pay
awards, inadequately represented the class by failing to pursue
class-wide monetary claims.262
The court acknowledged that notice was not mandatory in all
(b)(2) class actions.263 However, the court stated:
It does not follow that because notice in (b)(2) actions is not
made mandatory by Rule 23, every (b)(2) action in which notice
is absent will automatically bar all subsequent efforts by mem-
bers of the class to litigate claims that might have been brought
in the original class action. Before the bar of res judicata may be
applied to the claim of an absent class member, it must be
demonstrated that invocation of the bar is consonant with due
process. [Hansberry; Gonzales].264
The facts would appear to be guided by the Fifth Circuit's own
opinion in Gonzales, particularly since the court cited Hansberry
and Gonzales, both of which dealt exclusively with the adequacy
requirement rather than the issue of notice. But the court was faced
with a dilemma:
Johnson does not assert that the representation in Rowe was in-
adequate insofar as the named Rowe plaintiffs sought injunctive
or declaratory relief. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Rowe were ulti-
mately successful in obtaining such relief. Rather, Johnson relies
on the failure of the named Rowe plaintiffs to pursue class-wide
monetary awards. 265
The court skirted the dilemma by avoiding the adequacy issue
and grasping the handy notice issue. The court held:
Before an absent class member may be forever barred from pur-
suing an individual damage claim, however, due process requires
that he receive some form of notice that the class action is pend-
ing and that his damage claims may be adjudicated as part of
it.266
The Johnson class, therefore, was not barred by Rowe on its mon-
etary claims and yet could take advantage of Rowe by using collat-
eral estoppel against the defendant to establish liability on the
discrimination issue. In this way, the Johnson class would be able
to litigate only how much was owed rather than whether anything
262. Id.
263. Id. at 436.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 438.
266. Id.
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was owed.267
There are three major flaws with the court's reasoning:
(1) The court relied on the premise that the Rowe suit could not
adjudicate a money claim without notice to the class, when in fact
the Rowe suit did not adjudicate a money claim and the Rowe plain-
tiffs did not request that a money claim be adjudicated. Since mon-
etary claims existed at the time Rowe sued, and as in Gonzales, the
class representative did not pursue the full relief available, resjudi-
cata should not have been applied because the class was inade-
quately represented rather than because the class did not receive
notice.
(2) The court's position places a defendant in a no win situation.
If the Rowe class sues only for an injunction and wins, then the
Johnson class can use the win to obtain damages. If on the other
hand, the Rowe class sues only for injunctive relief and loses, then
the Johnson class can sue anew, at least for damages. In this situa-
tion, a court which awards the Johnson class damages could do so
only if it found that the defendant violated Title VII. Would such a
court deny injunctive relief and merely award damages? Such a po-
sition not only provides high grade fuel for those who mock our
judicial system but worse, it would undermine the purpose of Title
VII, which is to stop discrimination in employment, "one of the
most deplorable forms of discrimination known to our soci-
ety. .... -268 It is, therefore, likely that the court would provide
both injunctive and monetary relief 2 69 The situation encourages
267. This consequence clearly follows from the court's summary at the conclusion
of its opinion. The court said:
Under our analysis ... an absent class member is bound by the res judicata
effect of a (b)(2) class action to the extent that the judgment concerns injunc-
tive or declaratory relief, even when no notice was provided.. . . [We noted
that Johnson does not complain of the representation in Rowe with regard to
the injunctive and declaratory relief obtained in that suit. Under this analysis,
res judicata would bar Johnson's entitlement to relief duplicative of that al-
ready granted in Rowe or to relief which could have been sought in that
action.
Id. If Johnson is bound by res judicata, then of course Johnson can use resjudicata.
268. Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Culpepper v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970))).
269. Since Johnson conceded that the Rowe representation was adequate as to the
injunctive relief sought and obtained, the Johnson court never had to reach the ade-
quacy issue. See supra note 267. But if Rowe had lost and had only sought injunctive
relief, then Johnson would have sought both an injunction and damages, claiming that
he and his class were not bound by Rowe because of both inadequate representation and
lack of notice. That is, Johnson would not concede Rowe was an adequate representa-
tive as to any issue in the first suit. The Johnson court would then have had to decide
whether any part of Rowe barred Johnson. The court would have likely found that the
Rowe representatives, in failing to seek monetary relief, failing to provide notice, and
failing in their efforts at injunctive relief, did not adequately represent the class, and
would therefore likely permit Johnson to seek both injunctive and monetary relief.
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manipulation. The sharp class attorney would sue first for an in-
junction only, knowing that should the suit prevail the class would
be able to take advantage of the liability determination and litigate
damages only. This same attorney would also know that if the class
lost the first suit, the same class, with a different representative,
would be able to litigate anew in the hope of prevailing in a second
suit, or third suit and so on. Even before Vale 23 was amended, this
situation was seen as unfair. "[L]egal technicalities aside-it is un-
fair to afford the absentees all the benefits of winning but impose
upon them none of the burdens of losing. . . . The absentees are
permitted. . . in effect to place their bets after the race is over."'270
(3) The court hedged on the timing of the notice it said was re-
quired. As to whether it was speaking of prejudgment notice (pen-
dency notice) or post-judgment notice, the court merely
compromised: "In some cases it may be proper to delay notice until
a more advanced stage of the litigation; for example, until after
class-wide liability is proven." 271
No one will quarrel with a requirement that notice of the judg-
ment be provided the class so that the class members can present
individual claims. "Such notice is not a novel conception. For ex-
ample,. . . members of the class have been notified to present indi-
vidual claims after the basic class decision. '272 Unfortunately, the
270. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 713.
271. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 438.
272. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 106. Rule 23(d)(2) supra note 245, permits
the court to order notice if necessary for the protection of the class. The advisory com-
mittee notes to rule 23(d)(2) cite five circuit court and district court opinions in an
attempt to explain the meaning and circumstances in which such notice might be or-
dered. Each of the cited cases deals with post judgment notice, which was issued to
notify members of their right and obligation to present their individual claims based
upon the favorable determination of defendant's liability. Dickinson v. Burnham, 197
F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952) (old rule 23(a)(2) class action wherein notice was provided after
the liability determination so as to afford class members the right to share in the disposi-
tion of the property before the court); All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247
(2d Cir. 1954) (old rule 23(a)(3) class action wherein the court approved of deciding the
liability issue and then permitting class members to intervene in the suit); Brendle v.
Smith, 7 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (old rule 23(a)(1) class action wherein notice
provided by newspaper publication of class settlement was held sufficient when at a
prior date, mailed notice of the proposed settlement was provided the class); Gart v.
Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959) (old rule 23 (a)(1)
class action judgment, explaining that even though no notice was provided, Hansberry
permitted such a result particularly when the attorneys representing the class in the
state suit were the same as those in the present federal suit); Cherer v. Transitron Elec.
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) (old rule 23(a)(1) and (3) action wherein the
court refused to order notice to the class until trial on the merits, stating that, thereaf-
ter, notice can be ordered so that absent members can come in and present claims);
Hormel v. United States, 17 F.R.D. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (old rule 23(a)(3) action where
the court stated that plaintiff, who won on the merits, could then notify absent members
so they could intervene and take advantage of plaintiff's judgment). See also supra note
236.
If, on the other hand, the Johnson court was suggesting that a civil rights plaintiff
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court reinforced the supposed differences between the (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions and the (b)(3) class actions by blindly repeating
the homogeneous/heterogeneous distinction in order to arrive at
the notice requirement for the money damage claim, even though
all class actions in which class members must present individual
claims require post-judgment notice.273
Johnson wanted his cake and was able to eat it too. He accepted
the favorable result in Rowe, e.g., liability, but not the unfavorable
result, e.g., no monetary relief. If the Johnson court ruled that
Johnson was inadequately represented, as Hansberry and Gonzales
appear to require, then it would have had to deal with the effect that
such a decision would have on the Rowe litigation in terms of waste
of court and litigant time and resources. 274 The answer to all this
was provided by Judge Ingraham's strong language in Gonzales,
wherein he demanded that district courts conscientiously and me-
ticulously assure that the class is adequately represented. 275 As-
suming that the adequacy determination is properly decided, it is
likely that the class will be adequately represented throughout the
suit.276 Such a determination not only protects the class, it also pro-
tects the defendant because a defendant's win in the first suit will be
upheld and given resjudicata effect in a second suit. Both the plain-
tiff class and the defendant are bound regardless of outcome. As
the Supreme Court stated: "[I]t [is] unfair to allow members of a
class to benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting them-
selves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one. '277
Had the Johnson court relied on the adequacy of representation
issue,, it would have enforced Judge Ingraham's command and
thereby assured that all plaintiff classes and all defendants receive a
full, fair and final day in court. It is true that to do so the court
would have had to remand the case so as to retry what was already
litigated in the Rowe suit, but it is to be remembered that in the long
run such cost is slight if it assures that both plaintiff class and de-
fendant are treated equally and fairly. The court's reluctance to
"overturn" Rowe, in light of court congestion and defendant's reli-
ance upon the injunction, is understandable. However, court deci-
class which seeks damages as well as an injunction is entitled to pendency notice and the
ability of individual members to opt out, then the court has sown the seeds of destruc-
tion for (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. The utility of both those actions require one suit with
one result which will bind all. See supra notes 100-200 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 272.
274. In Rowe, the district court held that the defendant's promotional practices were
non-discriminatory. The Rowe suit was appealed, reversed, and remanded. The district
court then found in favor of the plaintiff class. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 434.
275. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
276. Id.
277. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
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sions must transcend the immediate concerns of one case and
endure for all future cases. In reliance on Hansberry and Gonzales,
the Johnson court should have reversed because the Rowe represent-
atives did not adequately represent the class. Such a decision, aside
from being honest and intellectually sound, would inure to the ben-
efit of future litigants and the courts. The district courts would cer-
tify class suits only after closely scrutinizing the representation and
assuring that throughout the litigation the representation remains
adequate. Defendants would seek decertification based upon inade-
quacy grounds in the hope of delaying, perhaps forever, class wide
recovery, and/or securing a favorable class judgment which would
not be subject to collateral attack by disgruntled class members.
The Rowe class attorneys probably did not request money damages
because of the fear that the district court would order them (or the
plaintiffs) to pay for notice to the class (otherwise the incentive of
attorneys' fees would have worked to secure the fullest relief possi-
ble). 278 Hence, resjudicata should never apply against the class if
the class was inadequately represented, regardless of whether or not
notice (of any type) was provided the class.
Even if the class was adequately represented, resjudicata should
not bind class members concerning claims which were rejected by
the district court because of the limitations inherent in the class
mechanism (e.g., manageability). This situation should be distin-
guished from a case where claims are rejected because of a decision
on the merits of the claim or because class counsel, for tactical rea-
sons, omitted the claim.279 For example, in a prior class suit where
the district court certified the class concerning claims for economic
278. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
279. Resjudicata ordinarily applies to what was litigated and to what might have
been litigated in the prior proceeding. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). See also Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J.
339, 342-44 (1948). But if plaintiff class counsel did raise the issue and it was specifi-
cally rejected because of the limitations of the class device, then the public policy of
treating litigants fairly would except such a situation from the application of the usual
rule. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 0.405[l]. The court in Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d
399, 408 (5th Cir. 1978), suggested a similar analysis when it excused the plaintiff's
personal injury claims from being barred by the resjudicata effect of a prior class judg-
ment in which plaintiff was a member because the court had "no way of knowing that
[the prior suit] would have been manageable as a class action if individual damage relief
had been requested."
The only other choices are to bind individual class members to a judgment wherein
the court rendering the judgment is either unable to adjudicate such claims or is unable
to prohibit class relief entirely because the entire relief to which the class is entitled
cannot be litigated in one action. The first alternative is plainly unfair to class members.
The second alternative deprives the class device of its dual objectives: eliminating mul-
tiplicity of suits and providing redress to small claimants. See supra notes 4-6 and ac-
companying text. The only realistic solution is to accept claims which the district court
excludes because of the limitations of the class device from the usual application of the
law of prior adjudication.
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damages, rejecting the plaintiff class's personal injury damage
claims as unmanageable (uncommon issues, atypical claims, etc.), a
member of the class should be permitted to litigate, individually,
his/her personal injury claim in a second suit even though the class
lost in the prior suit.280 More importantly, fairness to the defendant
requires that if in such a case the class wins, then individual class
members should not be permitted to apply the principle of collateral
estoppel/resjudicata so as to bind the defendant in a suit over the
unlitigated claim.281 Further, as a corollary to this fairness dcc-
trine, the class should never be able to send one of its members on a
sole mission to do battle with defendant in order to use collateral
estoppel against the defendant should the scout win, but not be
bound should she lose. As the Supreme Court said in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore,282 the offensive use of collateral estoppel should
"not. . .reward a. . .plaintiff who could have joined [a] previous
action .... "283 In other words, the plaintiff class should never be
permitted dry runs by some of its members, only to take advantage
of a win and not be bound by a loss. 28 4
In short, the factors necessarily determined before the adequacy
requirement is satisfied, coupled with the factors which must be
found in order for a class to use collateral estoppel against a defend-
ant, ensure that both the plaintiff class and the defendant will be
protected by one class judgment which binds all.
280. The class would be bound by the district court's determination of un-
manageability (uncommon issues, atypical claims, etc.), which of course it could appeal
in the first action. But each individual member should not be deprived of his/her day in
court on a claim merely because of the limitations of the class device. See supra note
279.
281. See supra notes 270, 277 and accompanying text.
282. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
283. Id. at 332.
284. The Johnson court permitted, indeed encouraged, a similar type of manipula-
tion by ruling that resjudicata did not bar the damage claims of the class because the
class was not provided notice. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court in Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330, described the danger of permitting a stran-
ger to use collateral estoppel offensively:
Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant
but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has
every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the hope that the first
action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.
After Johnson, the class attorney might best serve the class's interests by suing first for
an injunction and no money damages, then "wait and see." If this suit is successful, the
class can then join in for damages (because the class received no notice, the class is not
barred). On the other hand, if the class loses the injunction issue, the class attorney will
then file a second suit claiming the representation in the first suit was inadequate be-
cause the class did not seek damages, did not give notice and lost on the injunction
issue.
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B. Why Permit a (b)(3) Class Member to Opt Out of the Class?
Why does rule 23 provide members of the (b)(3) class with the
opportunity to opt out? Once again, the usual response is that there
is a philosophical difference represented by the homogeneous/heter-
ogeneous distinction between the (b)(1) and (2) class action and
(b)(3) class action. "In keeping with this philosophy class members
in Rule 23(b)(i) and Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not provided an op-
portunity by the rule to exclude themselves from the action as is
true in (b)(3) actions. s28 5 As the ACN state: "Indeed, under subdi-
vision (c)(2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely discretion-
ary, to give the members in a subdivision (b)(3) class action an
opportunity to secure exclusion from the class. '286
One of the major reasons old rule 23 was overhauled was that
class members were "permitted to intervene after a decision on the
merits favorable to their interests, in order to secure the benefit of
the decision for themselves, although they would. . . be unaffected
by an unfavorable decision. . . ." The new rule attempted to rectify
that unfairness. "[U]nder . . .(c)(3), one-way intervention is ex-
cluded . . . and. . . the judgment whether or not favorable, will
include the class .... 287 Rule 23(c)(3) states:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be
members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be mem-
bers of the class.2 88
Clearly, the thrust of the rule is to bind all members of the class
to the judgment, favorable or not, except those members who opt
out of the money type, or (b)(3) class.2 8 9 Yet, what good is served
by allowing an adequately represented (b)(3) class member to opt
285. Molina v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975) (available Mar. 7,
1985, on LExis, Genfed Library, Cir. file).
286. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 106-07; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2),
supra note 101.
287. ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 106.
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
289. Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the
class,. . . (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court con-
ducting the action cannot predetermine the resjudicata effect of the judgment;
this can be tested only in a subsequent action. The court, however, in framing
the judgment. . . must decide what its extent or coverage shall be, and if the
matter is carefully considered, questions of res judicata are less likely to be
raised at a later time and if raised will be more satisfactorily answered.
ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 106 (citations omitted).
1985]
67
Weiner: The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
out? Such an individual opts out because the individual either does
not want to make any claim against the defendant 290 and/or does
not want any redress.291 Therefore, pendency notice provides a
costly method for such an atypical individual to voice protest. If on
the other hand, an individual opts out and can afford to pursue his/
her claim alone, 292 one-way intervention is once again encouraged
and facilitated by the class action rule. The individual who opts out
will wait in the wings and hope the class will prevail on the main
liability issue; for certainly such an individual will be permitted to
advance collateral estoppel in order to prevent the defendant from
denying liability and simply go straight to his/her individual dam-
age claim. 293 If the class loses the liability issue, then and only then,
will the individual truly go it alone. Punishing the opting out mem-
ber by denying to him/her the use of collateral estoppel really pun-
ishes the defendant and the courts because such a rule would
compel multiple lawsuits (with the potential of inconsistent adjudi-
cations) and consequent waste of litigant (particularly the defend-
ant) and court resources. To permit opting out is to sanction
special treatment only to litigants that can afford the cost of this
type of manipulation at the expense of the plaintiff class (because of
the cost of pendency notice), the defendant and the courts. Worse
290. Such an individual need not make a claim against the defendant whether or not
provided with notice and/or the opportunity to opt out. By satisfying the prerequisites
of rule 23(a)(l)-(4), the class has demonstrated that sufficient numbers of persons with
common issues want redress and will be adequately represented.
291. See supra note 241.
292. The appropriate statute of limitation is tolled for each class member by the
filing of the class action. Once the individual opts out, the statutory period for com-
mencing an action would presumably begin running again on that individual's claim.
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974).
293. It is "the interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations . . .
[which allow] each [class] member to be excluded from the class upon his request."
ACN, supra note 79, 39 F.R.D. at 104-05. The idea is to give vent to individual desires,
because unlike the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, class members and the defendant will
not be substantially affected by individual suits. See generally supra notes 192-201 and
accompanying text. Therefore, permitting the opting out individual to wait in the wings
so as to take advantage of a class win, and not be bound by a class loss, does not
comport with the rationale for allowing the individual to opt out. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that a court would "punish" the opting out individual by not permitting
him/her to use collateral estoppel against a defendant who lost on the issue in a class
suit. In such a case, it would be hard to argue that the defendant did not use its full
resources in defense of the class action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979). By punishing the opting out individual, the court burdens the defendant (fur-
ther resources will be expended in defense, or in working out a settlement) and the
already congested courts. Moreover, it will always be difficult to determine whether the
opting out individual deliberately waited in the wings, as typical litigation delays can
cause the class suit to be tried first. Motivation (mens rea) is an important ingredient in
determining whether a stranger may use collateral estoppel offensively, although that
being so time consuming in itself, the better rule, in light of defendant's class loss and
court congestion, is simply to allow any opting out individual to take advantage of a
class win regardless of motivation. See generally, Dam, supra note 162.
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yet, this luxury is only available when money is at issue rather than
when claims concerning individual civil and constitutional rights
are at stake.
It is clear from this analysis that the pendency notice requirement
of rule 23 is founded on a distinction not based upon reason. It is
arbitrary in both theory and practice and contrary to the concerns
subsumed under the umbrella of the due process clause.294 It is
time to amend rule 23 so that all persons, including those with
small claims, can utilize its provisions while still affording proce-
dural protection to absentees.
IV. THE PROPOSED NEW RULE 23
The proposed rule recognizes that providing redress to large
numbers of people with identical small claims is a proper use of the
class action device. It proceeds on the premise that providing such
redress is an important state interest, one that is more important
than the supposed benefits obtained by a rule which requires pen-
dency notice to all ascertainable absent class members. Pendency
notice is very costly. Under the present rule, the pendency notice
requirement effectively forecloses the use of the class action mecha-
nism to those with small claims. Such claimants cannot afford to
pursue individual remedies because of the high cost of litigation,
particularly when compared to the size of their claims. Hence, as it
now stands, both individual and classwide relief is denied merely
because those injured haven't the funds to pursue claims. Pendency
notice is mandated by the present rule in order to permit absent
class members an opportunity to opt out of the class action and go
it alone. Such a concept of individualism may be lost on absent
class members with $70 claims. It is both curious and bizarre that
this concept of individualism is not activated when our cherished
individual rights are at stake. The present rule does not require
pendency notice to absent class members whose civil and constitu-
tional rights are in issue. So long as those persons are adequately
represented they will be bound by the class judgment. The justifica-
294. Due process protects one's right to participate in the process by which deci-
sions are made and thus expresses the dignity of the person. When individuals cannot
participate in the redress of their rights because of limited finances, due process is impli-
cated. The class action is the means of providing such class members with redress, i.e.,
participation in the process. Hence, the due process clause should welcome, rather than
defeat, this use of the class device. There is a functional value to the due process clause
as well. Due process intends to minimize subtantially unfair or mistaken deprivations
and ensure that actions accurately reflect substantive rules and accuracy of process.
The adequately represented class member, by definition, will participate in the action
such that both procedural and substantive due process are satisfied. The Hansberry
case and the factors listed in proposed rule 23(a) assure such a result. See generally, L.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-03 (1978).
1985]
69
Weiner: The Class Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
tion for this ironic turn in positions is that the present (b)(1) and (2)
class actions require uniform results for the protection of all parties
and, therefore, do not permit individual class members to opt out.
Hence, there is no need for pendency notice. The necessity which
compels uniformity in result in (b)(1) and (2) class actions is em-
ployed to justify dispensing with pendency notice. The proposed
rule takes the position that the necessity which compels the state to
provide redress to small claimants justifies dispensing with pen-
dency notice to absent class members in (b)(3) class actions. Fur-
ther, and equally important in dispensing with the pendency notice
requirement, is the fact that pendency notice, in such cases, is a
useless and costly exercise which secures nothing for its exorbitant
cost. A small claimant cannot (1) afford to monitor the action to
determine whether or not to go it alone, and (2) afford to go it
alone. Only a wealthy, small claimant can afford to opt out. When
he/she does, it will be at the expense of the class (the cost of pen-
dency notice), the defendant (who will suffer repeated lawsuits con-
cerning identical issues even if defendant wins in the pending class
action), and the courts (more congested calendars).
The rule proposed is as follows:
RULE 23. CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the rep-
resentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-
tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are*
satisfied, and in addition the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include: (1) the extent to which a class suit will
likely avoid inequity amongst class members; (2) the interest of
the courts and the party opposing the class in avoiding multiple
suits, multiple liability, inconsistent adjudications (particularly
those which establish incompatible standards of conduct); (3) the
extent to which individual adjudications would, as a practical
matter, substantially impair the interest of other class members;
(4) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (5) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of claims in the
particular forum; (6) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
[Vol. 22
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(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be
Maintained; Notice; Judgement; Actions Conducted Partially as
Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) The judgment in a class action, whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court
finds to be members of the class and shall be binding upon all
class members pursuant to the usual rule concerning the law of
prior adjudication. The law of prior adjudication shall not ap-
ply to those matters which were not litigated because the court
specifically excluded them pursuant to the requirements of this
rule rather than the merits of such matters. Such exclusion by
the court shall be made by order, in writing, and shall contain
a plain statement stating that the exclusion is not based upon
the merits of the matters excluded.
(3) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues,
or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions
to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate or-
ders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the pres-
entation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protec-
tion of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct
of the action, that the least costly method of notice appropriate
to the case be given to some or all of the class members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or
of the opportunity of class members to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and pres-
ent claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on interven-
ors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and
that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar pro-
cedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desira-
ble from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court and
notice to some or all the members of the class. The notice or-
dered pursuant to this subsection shall be the least costly method
of notice appropriate to the case and shall describe the proposed
settlement and/or dismissal and provide those notified with a
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reasonable time with which to object or otherwise intercede.29 5
295. Proposed rule 23(a) is identical to rule 23(a) and its goals: to ensure that a
sufficient number of persons are involved so that the class device is useful and/or neces-
sary ((a)(1)), and, most importantly, to ensure that the absent class members will be
adequately represented ((a)(2), (3) and (4)).
Proposed rule 23(b) departs from, and changes the definition of, class actions main-
tainable under present rule 23(b). In the proposed rule, the boundary of class actions
properly maintained is primarily defined by the broad scope of present rule 23(b)(3).
Proposed rule 23(b)(l)-(6) provides the district court with the matters to be considered
in deciding whether or not to permit the action to proceed as a class action. The first
three subparts of proposed rule 23(b) echo the concerns subsumed under present rule
23(b)(1) and (2) class actions. Hence, the primary concern is with rule 19 indispensa-
ble/necessary party type problems: Will individual suits prejudice absentees and/or
parties and, if so, is the prejudice sufficient to demand or permit class treatment or
insufficient so as to reject it? Even if insufficient, proposed rule 23(b)(4) may be avail-
able. Proposed rule 23(b)(4) is very important to the fair administration of the class
action device and is the heart of the changes which are proposed. Pursuant to proposed
rule 23(b)(4), the district court must decide whether to permit the maintenance of a
class suit even though it is unnecessary to do so under subparts (1), (2) and (3). Here,
individual suits will not prejudice the absent class members or parties before the court.
However, another type of necessity is involved: providing redress for persons with
small claims. This subpart recognizes that without the class action mechanism, class
members will not obtain redress and/or wrongdoers will not be deterred. This may
occur because class members are either unaware of the violation of their rights or be-
cause the cost of litigating individual suits is too high. If, on the other hand, the case is
of the type where class members are likely to both know of their rights and desire to
pursue individual remedies, then the class suit is inappropriate. For example, if Mr.
Eisen was suing on behalf of class members whose average claim was $20,000 rather
then $70, each member of the class would probably prefer to choose their own attorney
and sue locally. Convenience, the difficulty of engineering separate individual suits by
class members, the likelihood that a wrongdoer win escape justice, and the backlog and
congestion which individual suits will cause the courts, are factors to be considered
under this subsection. The remaining subsections (proposed rule 23(b)(4) and (5)) are
identical to present rules 23(b)(3)(C) and (D), although in the proposed rule both are
factors which must be considered in all class actions maintained. Under the present
rule, they limit the application of the rule 23(b)(3) class actions only.
Proposed rule 23(c)(1) and (3) and 23(d) are identical to present rule 23(c)(1) and (4)
and 23(d). They call for certification as soon as practical and allow for decertification,
if appropriate. They permit the use of subclasses if appropriate and provide the district
court with broad control in order to protect both present and absent parties. Within the
district court's discretion, is the authority to order pendency notice if that will guard the
right of absentees or otherwise serve the ends of justice. Hence, if plaintiff chooses a
defendant(s) to represent a defendant class, the district court will likely wish to order
pendency notice so that other defendant class members may join the defense. Further,
by way of example, if the district court, after hearing, has grounds to believe that a
conflict exists within the class between the class and the class attorney, communication
with class members may be the only way of establishing whether or not the class is
adequately represented, or that subclasses are needed, or that the class attorneys should
be disqualified.
Proposed rule 23(c)(2) drastically changes the present rule (rule 23(c)(2) and (3)).
Pendency notice is no longer required in order to enter a binding class judgment. Ex-
clusion by individual class members (and one-way intervention) is avoided. The pro-
posed rule recognizes and adopts the general principle of law, which holds that only a
second court may determine whether or not the rules of prior adjudication are applica-
ble. As with the present rule, the district court is required to describe the class in such a
manner that a second court can easily apply the rules of prior adjudication should it be
appropriate. One exception to the usual rules of prior adjudication is proposed. It is
that a class member not be bound by such rules in those circumstances wherein the
[Vol. 22
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Clearly, the present rule is not working. The federal courts are
using the present rule's categories to achieve a desired end rather
than as a means to determine whether or not and how to proceed
with a class action. The proposed rule provides a realistic approach
to the problem. It comports with both the theory of class actions
and the practice of the courts while still providing due process safe-
guards to parties and absentees.
district court, by order, in writing, specifically rejects a class claim because of the limita-
tions of the class device rather than because of the merits of the claim. Further, in such
a case the proposed rule contemplates that a class member will not be permitted to
benefit from the first suit when the party opposing the class could not do so.
Lastly, proposed rule 23(e), as with present rule 23(e) provides that a class action
cannot be settled or dismissed without court approval and notice to the class. However,
the proposed rule explicitly states that the notice must be of the type that is the least
costly and need not reach or even be required to attempt to reach all class members.
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